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QUEST FOR LEGAL SECURITY
THE QUEST FOR LEGAL SECURITY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS-LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS
A. A. Fafouros*
During the past few years increasing attention has been focused on
the problems of the security of foreign investments in the underde-
veloped areas. Efforts have been made to devise or develop legal means
by which their security would be assured and protected. The major
capital-exporting countries have placed new emphasis on their programs
of encouragement of such investments, sometimes introducing con-
siderable reforms in these programs to increase their effectiveness. The
capital-importing countries, on their part, have continued to offer as-
surances of fair and often privileged treatment to foreign investors.
There have been several suggestions for the institution of multilateral
schemes designed to provide protection and to thereby encourage in-
vestors. An earlier study I has dealt in detail with the forms, problems
and legal effects of the assurances given to foreign investors in order
to encourage them to invest in underdeveloped areas. The present
article is devoted to an examination of the latest developments in this
field and to an assessment of their importance and probable effects.
I. UNITED STATES PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
In its policy of encouragement of private investment abroad in the
last fifteen years, the United States government has been using two main
tools: the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties and the issuance
of guarantees against specified business risks. These are still its basic
tools, even though other means have often been suggested and on
occasion employed.
No major development has taken place with regard to the treaty
program of the United States. Its pace continues to be slow; since the
beginning of i96o, three new treaties of friendship, commerce and
navigation (FCN) have been concluded, only one of them with an
underdeveloped country.2 During this period five more treaties (one of
them a supplementary agreement importing investment provisions
* Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario.
i. See FATouRos, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962) [herein-
after cited as GUARANTEES], covering developments up to about the spring of 1961.
2. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations With Viet Nam, April 13 , 1961 [1961]
2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 17o4, T.I.A.S. No. 4890 (effective date Nov. 30, 1961). Another
treaty was signed on Feb. 21, 1961, with Belgium, and still another with Luxem-
bourg, signed Feb. 23, 1962. The Viet Nam treaty is of the same basic type as the
treaties with Ethiopia, Iran and Muscat and Oman; see GUARANTEES at 96.
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into an FCN treaty concluded in the early postwar years) have entered
into force, all of which had been signed earlier, some of them as long
as ten years before their entry in force.8 Only two of these involved
less developed countries. In all, fifteen FCN treaties have entered in
force since 1949, and only eight or nine of them were entered into
with countries that can be considered less developed.
It does not seem that the small number of treaties in force is due
to any lack of interest on the part of the United States government.
Indeed, in a statement submitted to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States Senate, 4 the Department of State revealed
that, since the beginning of the investment treaty program, formal treaty
proposals have been made to, or discussions on the matter initiated with,
all but three of the Latin American republics. The outcome of this
activity up to the time of writing has been that one treaty (with
Nicaragua) is now in force, three others (with Colombia, Haiti and
Uruguay) have been signed but have not entered into force, and two
others are under serious consideration by two unidentified Latin
American governments. While stating its determination to press forward
with treaty projects and proposals, the Department of State attributed
the program's lack of success to "deep-seated opposition by officials and
the public in many of the countries to commitments of the type con-
tained in our treaties. Such treaties are regarded as tending to infringe
upon the sovereignty and independence of individual countries." 5 In
its subsequent report to the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions expressed disappointment and perplexity over the program's
failure in Latin America. 6 There is no indication that any important
changes are contemplated in the content of these treaties.
It is in connection with the United States investment guarantee pro-
gram that important developments have taken place within the past
year Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,8 the administration of
3. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951
[1961] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 9o8, T.I.A.S. No. 4797 (effective date July 30, 1961); Con-
vention of Establishment With France, Nov. 25, 1959 [1960] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625 (effective date Dec. 21, 196o); Agreement Supplementing
the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Italy, Sept. 26,
1951 [1961] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685 (effective date March 2, 1961);
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights With Muscat and Oman,
Dec. 20, 1958 [1960] - U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1835, T.I.A.S. No. 4530 (effective date June
11, 196o); Treaty of Friendship and Commerce With Pakistan, Nov. 12, 1959 [1961]
1 U.S.T. S O.I.A. 11o, T.I.A.S. No. 4683 (effective date Feb. 12, 1961). For a list of
FCN treaties as of March 1961, with some indications of the reasons for delays and
non-ratifications, see GUARANTEES at 97.
4. Hearings on S. 2996 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1962) Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6o2-03 (1962). See also Id. at
520-21, 525-26.5 . Id . a t 6 3 .  
-E6. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 2962, S. Rc,,
No. 1535, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 (1962).
7. For a discussion of the program before the recent amendments, see GUARANTEES
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the program was transfered to the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID), and the rules regulating the issuance of guarantees under
the program were amended in several important respects. In addition
to the guarantees against the specific risks of nonconvertibility, expro-
priation and war losses, AID is now empowered to issue guarantees
covering risks of any kind, with the single exception of losses brought
about by reason of fraud or misconduct on the part of the investor.
Such guarantees were formerly issued by the Development Loan Fund,
but they were limited to non-business risks. The new legislation has
removed this restriction with a view to eliminating the element of
uncertainty that the distinction between business and non-business
risks involves. Guarantees of this sort are now available to both equity
and loan investments, though with certain limitations as to the extent
of the coverage. No more than seventy-five percent of the total value
of any specific investment can be covered; in the case of equity in-
vestments, no more than fifty percent will as a rule be covered. More-
over, no such guarantee may exceed the amount of ten million dollars.
All-risks guarantees are intended to cover investments occupying a
high priority position in the development plan of the country of
investment. According to official statements, the projects to which such
guarantees will be issued will generally be of such importance that they
would also qualify for intergovernmental loans.9 The Agency for
International Development has already made known some of the
criteria which are to be taken into account in deciding on an applica-
tion. These include the probable role of the project with respect to the
development of economic resources or expansion of production capaci-
ties, the "extent to which the recipient country is showing a responsive-
ness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people,
and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help
measures," and the possible effects of the project on the United States
economy. 10
Apart from the issuance of all-risks guarantees, the program has been
amended in other important respects. The Foreign Assistance Act of
196 1 requires only that "suitable arrangements" be made with the host
government with respect to the institution of a guarantee program.
This language provides more flexibility to the program, of yet uncertain
102-19, and literature cited therein. Descriptions of the program in its new form
are found in INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTI-
LATERAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE 24-26 (1962); Rubin, The Investment Guaranty
Program of the United States, 56 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGs 77 (1962).
8. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2181 (1962).
9. Statement by F. M. Coffin, later Deputy Administrator for Program, Agency
for International Development. Hearings on S. z983 Before The Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, International Development and Security, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
260, 264 (1961). See also Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on Foreign
Assistance Act of x961, S. REP. No. 612, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1961).
io. Department of State Press Release No. 744, October 27, 1961.
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extent, with respect to the specific content of the agreements which are
concluded with each country of investment prior to its inclusion in
the guarantee program. Guarantees may now be issued in exceptional
cases even before the conclusion of an international agreement with
the country of investment. With respect to expropriation guarantees,
the new legislation establishes that a breach of contract by the govern-
ment of the country of investment is equivalent to expropriation of the
alien's contract with that government. This appears to have been the
construction applied by the issuing agency even before the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, and the Act confirms its validity. The war-risk
guarantee has been extended by the addition of guarantees against
losses due to revolution or insurrection in the host country, both of
which were specifically excluded from the guarantees formerly issued.
Finally, guarantees covering investment in pilot or demonstration
housing projects in Latin America may now be issued under certain
conditions. The first such guarantee has already been issued.".
It is as yet too early for any assessment of the results of the recent
changes in the investment guarantee program. These changes cor-
respond largely to suggestions and proposals which had been made
during the previous operation of the program, but their effectiveness
remains to be seen. No all-risks guarantees have been issued by AID
as of June 3o , 1962, although three such guarantees, for a total of
just under sixty million dollars, had been issued before the recent
amendments by the Development Loan Fund and are still outstanding.
Apart from its two main programs of assistance to nationals investing
abroad, the United States government has been active in support and
promotion of foreign investment in various other ways. Its lending agen-
cies, such as the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund,
have continued to play an important role. 12 Both the Department of
Commerce and the AID are active in providing information and advice
to prospective investors. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorized
the AID to provide assistance to private firms seeking to conduct sur-
veys of investment opportunities in underdeveloped countries. 8 An-
other category of measures, those relating to tax policies as manifested
in domestic legislation and in tax treaties, is examined elsewhere in
this symposium.' 4 The United States government has been very cau-
I I. Agency for International Development, Alliance for Progress, Press Release
of August 30, 1962. Cf. Hearings on S. 2996, supra note 4, at 440-48.
12. For a recent study of their function and operation, see Mikesell, in U.S.
PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT ABROAD 273-406, 459-82 (Mikesell ed., 1962).
13. The U.S. Government may share up to 50 percent of the cost of such surveys.
It acquires full title to the survey report, if the private firm decides not to proceed
with the investment. For comments, see Hearings on S. 1983 Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., ist Sess. 266-67 (1961).
14. See Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving
Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERs L. REV. 428 (1963). For a recent authoritative
discussion of the related problems, see Mikesell, in op. cit. supra note 12, at 197-
211.
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tious and reserved in its attitude toward proposals for an international
investment convention; 15 and it seems to be pessimistic as to their
chances of success under present conditions. Its attitude toward the
more recent suggestions for an international investment insurance
scheme seems somewhat less negative, though still non-committal. 16
Finally, another recent legislative measure should be noted. In the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Congress has added a provision intended
to give further protection to American firms investing abroad.' Foreign
assistance to a country may now be suspended if that country has ex-
propriated, directly or indirectly, the property of United States nationals
and has failed to take, within six months from the date of its action,
remedial measures deemed appropriate by the President of the United
States. Such measures must include (apart, presumably, from the rather
improbable offer of restitution of the property) either prompt com-
pensation "in convertible foreign exchange" or arrangements, with
the consent of the parties concerned, for submission of the matter
to arbitration.
In his oral statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Secretary of State Rusk opposed the proposed amendment of the
act.'8 He pointed out, among other things, that the expropriation may
be effected by local rather than central authorities (as in the case of the
recent expropriations of public utilities in Brazil) and that if American
policy were to be tied to private foreign investments to such an extent,
it might become necessary for the United States government to interfere
extensively with the operations of private firms in order to protect its
own interests. In a further statement of the Department of State, 19 it
was argued that while this amendment would offer little help to the
investors, it might injure "the vital U. S. national interests which the
foreign assistance program is designed to further." The need for flexi-
bility was stressed, and it was pointed out that such an amendment
would tend to place the aid program at the mercy of any unreasonable
foreign official or any intransigent American investor, might retard the
land and other reforms which the United States was asking the Latin
American countries to undertake, and would lend force to the com-
munist allegation that the aid programs are "tools of U. S. capital."
It remains to be seen whether and how this provision will be given effect.
II. THE GERMAN TREATY AND GUARANTEE PROGRAM
The role of the German Federal Republic in international trade and
investment has acquired increasing importance in recent years. The
15. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
16. See Hearings on S. 1983, op. cit. supra note 13, at 266.
17. Pub. L. No. 87-565, 76 Stat. 255, § 301 (3), amending § 620 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.
18. See Hearings on S. 2966, op. cit. supra note 4, at 30-32.
19. Id. at 557-58.
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West German government is now engaged in providing development
assistance (in the form of both capital aid and technical assistance) to
underdeveloped countries, and it actively encourages the investment
of capital by its nationals in such countries. To the latter end, it has
concluded a number of treaties of friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion (FCN) and it insures its nationals against certain non-business
risks.
The FCN treaties concluded in the last few years by the Federal
Republic of Germany follow in their general lines the model of the
postwar FCN treaties of the United States; like the latter, they include
important provisions relating to the protection of investors. It would
seem, however, that only two of the recent German treaties have been
concluded with countries which may be called "less developed": the
treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the Dominican
Republic (signed, December 23, 1957) and the treaty of establishment
and navigation with Greece (signed, March 18, 1961). Denmark, Italy
and the United States, with whom FCN treaties have also been con-
cluded in the last eight years, are not economically underdeveloped. 20
The two treaties mentioned above seem to follow a common pattern,
although with important differences in their provisions. A comparison
of some of these provisions is of sufficient interest to warrant a more
extensive discussion, even though it is not yet possible to draw any
general conclusions.
Generally speaking, the provisions of the treaty with Greece are more
detailed than those of the treaty with the Dominican Republic; they
spell out with more precision the particulars of the protection to be
granted to nationals of each party in the territory of the other, and thus
limit more extensively the freedom of action of the signatory states
and decrease the probability of disputes over the application and in-
terpretation of the treaty. For instance, the treaty with the Dominican
Republic provides that matters of admission, residence and expulsion
of nationals of each party in and from the territory of the other will be
regulated by the latter in accordance with the provisions of its own
law; the parties only undertake to apply such provisions with "good
will" and to permit notification of the nearest consular representative
in cases of expulsion.21 The relevant provisions of the treaty with
Greece, 22 on the other hand, start with a general undertaking on the
part of each party to "facilitate" the admission and residence of
2o. Certain earlier FCN treaties dating since before the Second World War and
still in effect (e.g., with Iran, signed in 1929; with Thailand, signed in 1937) are not
dealt with in this paper.
21. German Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Dominican
Republic Dec. 23, 1957 [1959] Bundesgesetzbatt (II) 1468, art. 2 [hereinafter cited
D.R.].
22. German Treaty of Establishment and Navigation With Greece, Mar. 18, ig6i,
arts. 1, 2 [hereinafter cited Greece].
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nationals of the other party within its territory. The legal provisions
in force remain applicable, but it is stated that the length of residence
of a national will not be limited except for reasons of public order,
security, health or morals. The same criteria are to be applied with re-
spect to matters of expulsion or renewal of residence permits. It is
further provided that nationals of one of the contracting parties, re-
siding in the territory of the other, cannot be expelled without being
allowed to present their case against such expulsion and to appeal before
the competent authorities. Finally, long-time residents cannot be ex-
pelled except for reasons of public security, or if particularly grave
reasons of public order or morals obtain.
Both treaties provide that the nationals of each contracting party
will be accorded national treatment within the territory of the other
with respect to their protection and personal security. In addition, the
Dominican treaty guarantees treatment no less favorable than that of
the nationals of any third state or that recognized by international
law,23 while the treaty with Greece specifically provides for lack of dis-
crimination.24 The provisions concerning protection of the property
of aliens present considerable differences. In the treaty with the Domini-
can Republic it is provided that the property of nationals and companies
of each contracting party will enjoy "protection and security" within
the territory of the other. Any entry or search in the premises of such
nationals is to be conducted in accordance with the laws in force and
with all consideration for the persons living or working therein .2 . The
treaty with Greece provides for national treatment with respect to the
same matters. 26 Again, considerable differences are apparent in the
two treaties' provisions regarding expropriation of foreign-owned
property. The treaty with the Dominican Republic provides that
nationals and companies of each contracting party will enjoy in the
territory of the other the right of property in accordance with the rele-
vant constitutional provisions. Property may be expropriated only for
justified purposes of public utility or social interest and with payment
of just compensation. The legality of the measures and the amount
of compensation are to be subject to judicial proceedings.27 The rele-
vant provisions of the treaty with Greece 28 follow closely the model
of the United States treaties, although probably going somewhat further
in their assurances to foreign investors. Again, expropriation of foreign-
owned property is allowed only for reasons of public utility and with
compensation. 29 The latter must correspond to the value of the expro-
23. D.R., art. 4.
24. Greece, art. 3.
25. D.R., arts. 6(1), (2).
26. Greece, art. 50).
27. D.R., art. 6(4).
28. Greece, art. 5(3).
29. A Protocol attached to the treaty at the time of signature states (para. 6) that
'1963]
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priated property, be in effectively realizable form and be paid without
unnecessary delay.30 The measures relating to the determination and
payment of compensation must have been effected, at the latest, by the
date of the taking. The validity of the expropriation and the amount
of compensation are to be subject to the regular legal procedures.
Finally, the compensation can be freely repatriated up to the amount
of the capital originally invested and the profits which could be re-
patriated at the time of expropriation in accordance with the domestic
legislation in force.3'
Both the treaties here examined grant national treatment to nationals
of the contracting parties with respect to access to courts and executive
authorities.3 2 Their respective provisions on the regulation of economic
and commercial activities of aliens are also similar. 3 Nationals and com-
panies of each contracting party are to be accorded national treatment
with respect to exercising such activities, founding companies or ac-
quiring interests in existing ones. In both treaties, each party reserves
the right not to grant national treatment to aliens with respect to
certain industries, trades and occupations.34
The two treaties also differ considerably in their provisions on em-
ployment of nationals of a contracting party within the territory of
the other. The Dominican treaty contains only a general basic pro-
vision, 5 while the treaty with Greece regulates at length and in great
detail various aspects of the question.36 Another interesting point on
which the two treaties differ is the matter of exchange restrictions. The
treaty with the Dominican Republic provides in some detail for the
situations in which such restrictions may be imposed,3 7 while the
Greek treaty does not even mention the subject.38 Both treaties contain
certain other provisions, such as those relating to navigation, which are
the term "expropriation" is understood to refer to any deprivation or limitation of a
property right.
3o. For closely resembling provisions, see article 5(4) Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation With Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954 [1956]
2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3573 (effective date July 14, 1956) and Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Greece, Aug. 3, 1951 [1954] 2 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057 (effective Oct. 13, 1954), art. 7(3).
31. Greece, art. 5(4).
32. D.R. art. 7; Greece, art. 6.
33. D.R. art. 8; Greece, art. 7.
34. D.R. arts. 7(3), (4); Greece, art. 7(5), and Protocol, para. ii. The lists of in-
dustries and occupations in the two treaties are not identical.
35. D.R., art. io.
36. Greece, arts. 7(2), (3) and 8; and Protocol, para. 9-14.
37. D.R., art. 15; cf. GUARANTEES 155-57.
38. Apart from the provision relating to repatriation of the compensation for
expropriated property, already mentioned. Provisions relating to exchange re-
strictions may have been included in the Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, signed on March 27, ig6i, which is not yet in force and whose text
was not available to the writer. It is very probable that this treaty has followed
the model of the similar treaty with Pakistan, discussed infra, which includes pro-
visions on exchange restrictions.
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of no special interest to the present discussion. Any dispute regarding
the interpretation or application of the treaties is to be submitted
to arbitration. The treaty with Greece provides in detail for the con-
stitution and operation of the arbitral tribunal 39 but, unlike the
treaty with the Dominican Republic, it does not contain any provision
for the submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice in
the case where such a tribunal is not constituted,40 nor for the constitu-
tion, at the request of either party, of a Mixed Commission to act as
conciliator in case of dispute.
41
As was stated at the very outset, it is not possible to draw any general
conclusions from the comparison of the two treaties. It cannot be said,
at this point, that the treaty with Greece, having been executed more
than three years subsequent to that with the Dominican Republic, is
necessarily indicative of the present approach of the German govern-
ment and that, therefore, future treaties with less developed countries
should be expected to be as detailed and to provide as extensive protec-
tion to foreign investors. The special conditions which obtain in the
case of the treaty with Greece may be sufficient to account for these
differences. 42 Thus, the provisions on admission, residence, expulsion
and employment of aliens involve reciprocal advantages for the two
countries relating to the investment of capital, on the one side, and to
the emigration of available excess labor, on the other. As to the
provisions on the protection of foreign-owned property, they appear to
be somewhat more strict than those already included in the treaty of
friendship, commerce and navigation of 1951 between the United
States and Greece, but not basically different. In the absence of further
evidence, then, the comparison between the two treaties can only serve
to indicate that the Federal Republic of Germany is willing and able
to take full advantage of the flexibility of the FCN treaty as a means
for the protection of foreign investment.
In addition to its program of FCN treaties, the German government
39. Greece, art. 28.
40. It is true, however, that the treaty with the Dominican Republic provides
only for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal by the parties within three months
after receipt of the relevant request. It does not contain any details as to the pro-
cedure to be followed, and, therefore, it leaves open the possibility that one of the
parties will refuse to cooperate and thus make the constitution of the tribunal im-
possible. The Greek treaty provides more specifically for the appointment of one
arbiter by each party and an umpire by mutual agreement. It also provides that, if
one of the parties does not appoint its arbiter or no agreement is reached as to the
person of the umpire, the President (and, in some cases, the Vice-President or senior
member) of the International Court of Justice will appoint the missing arbiter or
umpire, as the case may be. The arbitral tribunal can thus be constituted even if one
of the parties refuses to cooperate.
41. D.R., arts. 23, 24; and see GUARANT 'S 185.
42. It should also be pointed out that this is a treaty of establishment and not of
friendship, comerce an navigation as is the treaty with the Dominican Republic.
It does not appear, however, that the name of the treaty is of major importance,
and the United States, at least, employs these appellations interchangeably.
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is actively engaged in promoting foreign investment in other ways.
Together with the Swiss government, it is at the time of writing the
only government that has shown at least some official interest in the
adoption of a code for the protection of foreign investment. To that
end, it has submitted to the Organization of European Economic Co-
operation (now the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment) a draft text which has been under consideration for the last
three years. 43 The German government has also inaugurated a program
for insuring the investments of its nationals in underdeveloped coun-
tries against non-business risks. This program has been described in
some detail elsewhere; 44 the present discussion will deal only with
certain international aspects of its operation.
The legislative provision establishing the program stated that such
insurance would be available to German nationals and companies in-
vesting in countries which have concluded related agreements with the
Federal Republic of Germany, countries whose legal order affords suf-
ficient assurance as to the treatment of foreign investors, or countries
which give such assurances by means of actions or instruments other
than an international treaty. Most of the guarantees issued up to now
cover investments in countries which have concluded no special agree-
ment with the German Federal Republic. However, it appears that
this is considered as a transitional stage of the program and that the
creation of a network of special intergovernmental agreements is en-
visaged. A distinct type of instrument has already been developed, en-
titled "treaty for the promotion and protection of investments." Eight
such agreements with less developed countries have already been con-
cluded.45
The first treaty of this type, and the only one in force at the time
of writing, was concluded with Pakistan. Subsequent agreements are
said to follow its model. This agreement provides that the investments
by nationals and companies of one party in the territory of the other
shall not be subjected to discriminatory treatment by reason of their
foreign ownership "unless legislation and rules and regulations framed
thereunder existing at the time of coming into force of this Treaty
provide otherwise." 41 Another clause provides that the investment and
other business activities carried on by nationals of either party in the
territory of the other will not be discriminated against "unless specific
stipulations are made in the documents of admission of an invest-
43. See text accompanying note 91 infra.
44. See GUARANTEES 112-14; INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE 28-29 (1962).
45. Agreements have been concluded with Pakistan (1959), Iran (1961), Greece
(1961), the Federation of Malaya (1961), Togo (1961), Morocco (ig6i), Liberia (1961)
and Thailand (1961).
46. German Treaty For Promotion and Protection of Investments With Pakistan,
(1959) art. 1(2) [hereinafter cited Pakistan].
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ment." 47 In the Protocol attached to the treaty are listed certain types of
measures which are to be considered discriminatory. The list is not
exhaustive; it includes,
Restricting the purchase of raw or auxiliary materials, of power or fuel,
or of means of production or operation of any kind, impeding the
marketing of products within or outside the country, as well as any other
measures not applied to the same extent either to persons residing
within the country and to nationals of third states or to investments of
such person.48
The agreement further provides for the "protection and security"
to be enjoyed by investments and for the conditions under which prop-
erty of the nationals of either party may be expropriated in the territory
of the other. The relevant provision closely resembles the corresponding
clause of the FCN treaty with Greece described above. It is further
stated in the Protocol to the treaty that the term "expropriation" in-
cludes "acts of sovereign power which are tantamount to expropriation,
as well as measures of nationalization." 49 The treaty provides also for
the grant of national treatment to foreign investors with respect to
compensation for any losses arising out of war or other armed con-
flict.50 The agreement in question contains strong provisions relating
to the repatriation of the invested capital and its earnings. It is
unequivocally stated in article 4 that, "Either Party shall in respect of
all investments guarantee to nationals or companies of the other Party
the transfer of the invested capital, of the returns therefrom and in
the event of liquidation, the proceeds of such liquidation." Other
articles regulate in detail the modalities of such transfer as well as the
eventual subrogation of the signatory governments to the claims of
their nationals.5 1 Both in the main text of the treaty 52 and in notes
exchanged at the time of signing, it is expressly stated that the provisions
of the treaty do not affect in any manner the promises of special or
privileged treatment which have been granted in the past and may be
granted in the future to specific investments by the host country's
government. Detailed provision is made for the settlement of any
related dispute by consultation between the parties or, if that is not
successful, by arbitration. 53
Two other provisions of the treaty for the promotion and protection
47. Pakistan, art. 2.
48. Protocol, para. 2. It is further provided that measures taken for reasons of
public order, security, health or morality will not be deemed discriminatory.
49. Protocol, para. 3.
5o.A similar provision is usually included in the agreements of the United States
with underdeveloped countries which relate to the U.S. investment guaranty pro-
gram. See GUARANTEES io6 n. 159.
51. Pakistan, arts. 5, 6.
52. Pakistan, art. 7.
53. Pakistan, art. 11; its text is almost identical with that of article 28 of the
FCN treaty with Greece; see text accompanying note 39 supra.
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of investments are worth noting. Its first article contains a general
declaration of favorable consideration of capital investments by one
party in the territory of the other. The parties undertake to "give
sympathetic consideration to requests for the grant of necessary per-
missions." It is further provided, at this point, that "in the case of
Pakistan such permissions shall be given with due regard also to their
published plans and policies." By this unmistakable reference to the
Pakistani government's statements of industrial policy or of policies
regarding foreign investment, these statements are in effect incorporated
into the treaty by a process usually reserved to legislative enactments.
Secondly, the treaty under discussion will be applicable not only to
new investments, but also to investments made before its entry into
force, provided they were made before September 1, 1954. 54 Such a
provision extending the undertakings under the treaty to investments
made even before the institution of the guarantee program is not to
be found in the related agreements concluded by the United States
in connection with the operation of its own investment insurance pro-
gram.
The contents of this type of agreement add considerable significance
to the conclusion during the past year of a relatively high number
of similar agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and
less developed countries. They would seem to be a sufficient substitute
for the FCN treaties as far as the provisions on expropriation and ex-
change restrictions are concerned, although certainly not with respect
to matters of admission and residence of aliens, their engaging in
business activities and the possible employment of personnel of foreign
nationality. In fact, the Protocol to the treaty with Pakistan expressly
declares the intention of the parties to enter into negotiations regarding
the conclusion of a treaty of establishment which would deal with these
and related matters.55 It is significant that within the past few years
eight agreements on the promotion and protection of investments but
only two FCN treaties were concluded with less developed countries.
This may be construed as an indication that at least some of the under-
developed countries are prepared to give binding assurances with re-
spect to a limited number of subjects when a reasonably clear and
certain quid pro quo (participation in the insurance program) is in-
volved. The same countries may not be willing to grant broader as-
surances in the abstract, by means of an establishment treaty. The evolu-
tion of the German program in the next few years will show whether
such a conclusion is justified.
III. MEASURES BY CAPITAL-IMPORTING COUNTRIES
In the past few years, a great number of statutes relating to the regu-
lation and encouragement of foreign investment have come into effect.
54. Pakistan, art. 9.
55. Protocol, para. i. The provision includes a detailed list of subjects.
[Vol. 17
QUEST FOR LEGAL SECURITY
Many newly founded states have enacted such statutes within the first
two or three years of their independence. A recent list of investment
laws r1 (including both laws directed specifically to foreign investment
and laws addressed to all investors, foreign and domestic) gives a total
of over fifty-five statutes or amendments of statutes of various forms
which have been enacted since 1950. This figure does not include about
ten statements of policy concerning investment which had been issued
during the same period. Of the fifty-five statutes, about fifteen were
enacted before 1955, twenty between 1955 and 1959, and another
twenty in the two-year period 1959-196o. No generalization can be
made as to regional distribution. Measures to encourage foreign invest-
ment are in force in more than twelve African states, in virtually all the
Latin American states and in about fourteen Asian and eight Middle
Eastern states. The increased incidence of such statutes is an obvious
fact of today's international scene.
As to the form of these measures, it should be noted that while a
number of states continue to favor official policy statements rather than
formal statutes, the latter are now more in use than had been the case. A
definite trend in favor of such statutes, which incorporate the bulk of the
governmental measures designed to promote foreign investment in the
country issuing them, is now evident. This may be due in part to
accidental factors; thus, statutes rather than policy statements are issued
by most of the newly independent countries where a civil law system
prevails (such as the former French territories in Africa or Asia).
However, such factors are by no means sufficient to account for the
trend. Foreign investors, too, seem to favor statutes. It has been re-
ported, for instance, that prospective United States investors considered
insufficient the earlier Thai methods of regulating foreign investment
by means of the 1954 act supplemented by subsequent official state-
ments and declarations. The investors' preference for a more formal
and comprehensive investment statute was apparently a leading cause
for the enactment of the Industrial Investment Promotion Act.57 In
Burma, as well, an investment statute, enacted in 1959, has replaced
the statements of policy which were used before.
It cannot, however, be asserted that the importance of statements
of policy is definitely on the decline. Such statements still form the basis
of the relevant regulations in a number of countries, most notably in
Ceylon, India and Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan's policy statements were
formally referred to in the text of the 1959 treaty for the promotion and
protection of investments between Pakistan and the Federal Republic
56. Annex IV to The Promotion of the International Flow of Private Capital,
U.N. Sec. Gen. Rep. U.N. Doc. E/ 3 49 2 May 18, 1961. The list is already in part out
of date, since several states enacted legislation of this type during 1961 and 1962.
57. B.E. 2503 (196o). See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN COMMERCE WEEKLY,
December 19, 196o, p. 8.
1963]
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
of Germany.-8 This would seem to place them on an equal footing
with legislative acts.
The more recent investment statutes do not differ radically, in their
form or their content, from the statutes issued in the early postwar
years. A distinction may still be made between statutes addressed
specifically to foreign investors and statutes designed to encourage
private investment from all sources, foreign as well as domestic. The
former are of somewhat more recent origin and generally contain as-
surances on the repatriation of earnings and capital in addition to any
other provisions. The latter are more traditional in their approach;
they provide mainly for exemptions from various taxes to be granted
to certain categories of enterprises. This distinction, however, is now
losing whatever limited importance it had in the past. The existing
trend is in favor of more comprehensive instruments, and a typical
formula for an investment statute may be said to be emerging. Few of
the recent investment laws deal solely with the lifting of exchange
restrictions. Most of them provide for exemptions from income tax,
customs, duties and other kinds of taxes, as well as for assurances for the
free transfer abroad of the earnings or capital of the enterprise involved.
Such exemptions or assurances are to be accorded to approved invest-
ments only. Guarantees of non-expropriation and non-discrimination
are also often included. Investment statutes invariably provide for the
administrative procedure which has to be followed by the investors who
desire to place their investment under the statute. Generally, investors
have to file an application which is considered by the appropriate
governmental agency. If the application is approved, an instrument of
approval is generally issued which sets out in detail the assurances
and guarantees given to the investor as well as the promises and repre-
sentations made by the investor himself regarding the enterprise he
intends to establish.
The practice of issuing instruments of approval of this type seems
to have prevailed over all other methods of signifying the investment's
approval. It has been noted elsewhere 19 that some of the statutes refer
to these instruments as "contracts" or otherwise emphasize their con-
tractual character, while in other statutes the instruments in question
are treated as simple administrative acts. This observation remains
valid for the more recent statutes, as well. The Chilean Decree-Law No.
258 of 196o provides that the instrument of approval "will be in the
nature of a contract;" 60 the Costa Rican Law of Industrial Protection
and Development of September 3, 1959, also refers to the relevant
58. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
59. See GUARANTEES 192-209, where the question of the legal character of in-
struments of approval is also dealt with.
6o. Art. 25. Text in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WORLD TRADE INFORMATION SERV-
ICE [hereinafter cited as WTIS] Part i, No. 6o-25, p. 4.
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instruments as "contracts." 61 The Investment Code of the Ivory Coast
refers to "establishment conventions" which state and guarantee the
conditions of the establishment and functioning of the enterprises bene-
fiting from the exemptions under the code.62 On the other hand, the
Guatemalan Industrial Development Law, Decree No. 1317 of October
23, 1959, provides only for the issuance of a "government resolution"
setting out in detail the assurances given by and to the investor.63 The
Industrial Investment Promotion Act of Thailand provides for the
issuance of "promotion certificates," 64 while the Moroccan investment
law contains no provision at all concerning the issuance of instruments
of approval. The investor benefits from the guarantees and assurances
provided for in the statute by virtue of his registration or of specific
decisions of an Investment Commission. 65
It was noted at the beginning of this article that information con-
cerning, among other things, the measures taken by capital-importing
countries to attract foreign investment is now increasingly becoming
available in the United States. Translations of many, though not all,
relevant statutes are now in print, though not yet in an up-to-date
collection.66 Comments on particular statutes or on the related law
of specific countries appear more and more frequently in the reviews,
and bibliographies of such writings have already been compiled. There
is less information with respect to the application of the investment
laws themselves, its problems and the methods followed for their
solution. Without such information, the legal studies as to the validity
and role of investment statutes or instruments of approval can be
nothing more than guesswork. On the other hand, the lack of such
information does indicate, if not that no problems have ever arisen in
this connection, at least that major cases of violations of promises given
through investment laws and instruments of approval have not been
common in the last few years. It is still important, however, to study
some of the everyday problems that have arisen and the way in which
they have been resolved.
61. Art. 36; WTIS, Part i, No. 59-79, P. 5. The same term is used in the Produc-
tion Development Law of February 7/8, 1957, of Panama, arts. 8, 17, 22 and 23;
WTIS, Part 1, No. 58-74, pp. 3-5. It is interesting to note that art. 7(k) of this law
requires that "foreign enterprises formed partly or totally with foreign capital," will
have to "renounce all diplomatic claims" in order to become eligible for such con-
tracts. This last provision is not common in investment statutes.
62. Law No. 59-134, of Sept. 3, 1959, determining the code for private invest-
ments in the Republic of Ivory Coast art. 9. WTIS, Part i, No. 61-72, p. 8.
63. Art. 21; WTIS, Part i, No. 6o-13, p. 8.
64. Supra note 57, §§ 16, 17; WTIS, Part 1, No. 51-57.
65. Dahir No. 1-60-383 of 12 Rejeb l38O (December 31, 196o) Instituting Meas-
ures to Encourage Private Investments; WTIS Part 1, No. 61-59.
66. Several of the more recent texts are printed in WTIS. For an earlier, but still
the only, collection of texts, now in part out of date, see BAADE, GESETZGEBUNG ZUR
F6RDERUNG AUSLANDISCHER KAPITALANLAGEN (1957).
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As an illustration of the spirit in which at least some of the capital-
importing countries understand their obligations under the statutes for
the encouragement of foreign investment, we may here examine a
series of cases decided by the Greek Council of State. This is the highest
administrative tribunal of the Kingdom of Greece; it is fully judicial
in character, and its function and operation correspond largely to (they
are in fact modeled on) those of the French Conseil d'Etat. It has the
power to annul any act of the executive which exceeds the authority
granted to the particular executive organ involved or which is issued
in breach of a statutory provision. The cases here discussed deal with
requests for the annulment of administrative acts relating to the applica-
tion of instruments of approval issued under the Greek investment
law.67 The law in question has a peculiar constitutional position, by
virtue of which it can only be amended by way of a constitutional
amendment, the procedure for which is much stricter and more difficult
than that for the amendment of an ordinary statute.68 Its constitutional
position was not, however, involved in the cases at hand.
This is not the place for an extensive summary of the Greek invest-
ment statute, descriptions of which are already available. 69 Only some
of its features will be noted-those indispensable for the comprehen-
sion of the cases relating to it. The statute in question provides for the
grant of certain assurances, relating chiefly to taxation, exchange con-
trol and non-expropriation, to approved foreign investments. Prospec-
tive investors are required to file an application with the competent au-
thorities. If it is approved, a special instrument of approval is issued
setting out in detail the obligations undertaken by the investor and the
assurances and guarantees granted to him by the government. The
instrument is in the form of a Royal Decree or of a joint decision of
three ministers, depending on the importance of the investment. The
statute provides expressly that this instrument shall be the govern-
ment's guarantee to the investor and that it "shall be irrevocable with
respect to the terms and conditions under which it is granted in each
case." Modification of such terms is allowed only with the foreign
investor's consent. The statute applies to long-term investments when
67. Legislative Decree 2687 of October 22/November io, 1953, re: Investment
and Protection of Foreign Capital. The text is printed in 7 REVUE HELLtNIQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 251 (1954) and in WTIS, Part I, No. 55-64.
68. Article 12 of the Greek Constitution of 1952 provides that "a law to be issued
once and for all shall provide for the protection of funds imported from abroad
for investment in the country." L.D. 2687/1953 was issued in implementation of this
provision and cannot now be amended without the prior amendment of the con-
stitutional provision.
69. For summaries of its content, see: Lambadarios, Protection accordie par le
ddcret 2687/1953 aux investissements a longue dchdance de capitaux venant de
l'dtranger, 7 REVUE HELLANIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 219 (1954); Lambadarios,
Greece, in LEGAL AsPEcrs OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 232, 244-47 (Friedmann and
Pugh ed., 1959).
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qualified as "productive investments" by the appropriate government
authorities 70 and, by virtue of special provisions, 71 to ships rated at
over 1,500 gross tons. The registration of such ships under the Greek
flag is the equivalent of the importation of their value in foreign
capital.
In an important early decision, 72 the Council of State held that the
provisions of the investment law concerning the issuance of instru-
ments of approval override earlier statutes requiring certain permits
for the establishment of industrial enterprises. The court pointed out
that the minister competent for the issuance of such permits partici-
pates in the decision approving the importation of foreign capital.
It stated further that the criteria laid down by the investment law for
the approval of proposed investments are different and much broader
than those provided for in the legislation on the establishment of
industrial enterprises. The discretionary power of the ministers issu-
ing the instrument of approval is correspondingly more extensive.
In substance, the only requirement laid down by the law is that the
investment should be productive and should contribute to the eco-
nomic advancement of the country. The Council of State can, there-
fore, review their decision only in the extreme case where it is objec-
tively clear that the investment is non-productive.
Other cases before the Council of State related to instruments of
approval containing the terms and conditions under which certain
ships were registered under the Greek flag. Their owners appear to
have been of Greek nationality, but this does not affect in any way the
application of the statute by the court since the protection of the
statute extends to capital imported from abroad, regardless of the
investors' nationality.7 3 In all instances, the Council of State upheld
the binding character of the instruments of approval, striking down
any subsequent administrative acts inconsistent with the assurances
contained in the instruments. The court has insisted that, in view of
the broad discretionary power which the statute gives to the compe-
tent ministers, strict compliance with the statutory provisions is in-
dicated, both in the original instruments of approval and in any sub-
sequent administrative act.
Three of the cases arose over administrative acts relating to a single
ship, registered under the Greek flag in 1959. One of the clauses of the
7o. The statute also contains special provisions concerning short-term invest-
ments of foreign capital.
71. Greek Investment Statute, art. 13.
72. Greek Council of State Judgment [hereinafter cited Judgment] 493/1958.
73. "In order to be protected, the capital to be invested in the country must beimported from abroad; according to both the constitutional language and the pro-
visions of the statute, the source from which they originate is irrelevant; they may




original instrument of approval provided that the ship was not to carry
passengers or freight between Greek ports. Another clause provided
for a possible exception to this prohibition: the ship was to be allowed
to carry passengers and freight between two or more Greek ports in
cases of imperious traffic needs. It was provided that the existence of
such needs was to be determined and the permission granted or refused,
as the case may be, by a decision of the Minister of Merchant Marine.
Such a decision was issued a few months later, and the ship in ques-
tion was allowed to carry passengers and freight between certain Greek
ports. This decision was attacked before the Council of State by the
competing shipowning companies. The court held that, in view of the
express provision of the statute as to the ways to which instruments of
approval may be issued or amended (i.e., by Royal Decree or by joint
decision of three ministers), the three ministers could not delegate
their power to amend or regulate the application of the instrument
of approval to a single minister. The decisions of the Minister of
Merchant Marine were therefore annulled. 74 After this decision, the
shipowner involved petitioned the three competent ministers, request-
ing that they issue a decision on the matter. It appears that a decision
permitting the ship to carry passengers between Greek ports was pre-
pared and signed by two of the ministers, but the third delayed his
signature for a considerable time. The shipowner concerned then ap-
plied to the Council of State for a declaration that the minister's omis-
sion to sign was illegal and a violation of a duty imposed by the statute.
The court upheld the petitioner's request, holding that the minister
should either sign the decision or issue, together with the other two
ministers, a reasoned joint decision rejecting the application.7 5 Instead
of such a decision, the three ministers issued a joint decision amend-
ing the related provisions of the instrument of approval. The shipowner
again petitioned the court for annulment of the amending act. In its
judgment,76 the Council of State pointed out that such an amendment
constituted a modification of the terms and conditions under which
the ship was registered under the Greek flag and was admitted as for-
eign capital investment. According to the express provision of the
statute, such a modification was possible only with the investor's
consent. In the absence of such consent, the amending administrative
act was annulled.
The irrevocable character of the instrument of approval was also
74. Judgment 217/196o. The court had already rendered a decision to the same
effect in a previous case, involving similar facts; Judgment 98o/1959. In subsequentjudgments, the court stated that, in view of the illegality of the delegation of
authority to a single minister, the permission to carry passengers and freight between
Greek ports should be granted or refused by joint decision of the three ministers
who had issued the original instrument of approval.
75. Judgment 15o9/ 196o.
76. Judgment 130/1962.
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stressed in another decision of the Council of State relating to an
application by a shipowning company for the annulment of one of
the provisions of the instrument approving the registration of its ship
under the Greek flag. The provision involved was again one preclud-
ing the routing of the ship in a particular line. The judgment of the
court 77 dealt in some detail with the character of the instrument of
approval. It pointed out that in view of the privileged status of the
foreign capital imported under the statute, it could not be said that
the instrument of approval concerning a specific investment was manda-
tory in character, imposing upon the investor the obligation to import
his capital. Instead, it gave him an option to do so and thereby bring
himself within the provisions of the statute and of the instrument of
approval, or not to do so and thus avoid both the advantages and the
obligations of these provisions. Since the petitioner, in full knowledge
of the content of the instrument of approval, went ahead and registered
its ship in accordance with the statute, thus freely accepting the pro-
visions of the instrument of approval, it could not now be heard to
attack the whole or part of the instrument. The request was accord-
ingly rejected.
It is interesting to note that in none of these decisions does the court
refer in express terms to the partly contractual character of the instru-
ment of approval. It did not have to, of course, since it could reach
the same result by applying the express provisions of the statute with-
out more. All the relevant cases have related to acts of the executive
and not of the legislature. In view of the constitutional character of
the investment statute, however, it appears certain that any attempt
of the legislature to amend the statute in violation of the express con-
stitutional provision would be met with a declaration of the amend-
ment's unconstitutionality by either the administrative or the regular
courts.
IV. LATEST EFFORTS FOR AN INVESTMENT CODE
In the past few years, increased efforts have been made toward the
creation of a multilateral system of protection of private foreign invest-
ments. They have taken three main directions, which are distinct
even though related not only in their overall aims but also, possibly,
in their implementation. First, the efforts for the adoption of a multi-
lateral convention embodying a code of rules for the fair treatment
of foreign investors have continued, the related suggestions being
rather less numerous than in the immediately preceding years, but
being considered on a more official level. Second, and in part, in con-
nection with the code proposals, the possibility of instituting a multi-




Third, detailed suggestions have been made with respect to the crea-
tion of an international claims tribunal or of a system of arbitral tri-
bunals to deal with investment disputes. The practical value of all
these proposals remains to be seen. However, the related discussions
are useful for they tend increasingly to bring into the open the prob-
lems and salient issues of foreign investment. It is now becoming in-
creasingly probable, though still by no means certain, that some multi-
lateral action will be taken in this field, probably one going in the
third of the directions mentioned above, namely, the creation of a
judicial or semi-judicial procedure for the settlement of disputes be-
tween foreign investors and the governments of the countries of invest-
ment. Solutions must be found for a great number of problems,
however, before any really effective action is undertaken.
Support for a multilateral convention for the protection of foreign
investments has recently been reiterated by some private bodies which
had supported the idea in the past. Thus, the International Chamber
of Commerce, in a preliminary statement of views on multilateral in-
vestment insurance, 7 expressed the opinion that such a system of in-
surance should be combined with a code containing the basic "broad
principles governing international investment" which the parties par-
ticipating in the insurance scheme should undertake to observe. It is
interesting to note that the combination of the code and insurance
schemes was supported by about 6o percent of the businessmen who
answered a related questionnaire prepared jointly by the World Bank
and the International Chamber of Commerce. About one-third of the
respondents to the questionnaire gave a negative answer on the point.7 9
In its statement, the International Chamber of Commerce did not spec-
ify the principles to which it was referring; it only stressed the need for
study of the related problems and for the inclusion, in addition to any
substantive rules, of some provision in any such code for the settlement
of disputes by arbitration. Nor did it express any preference with re-
spect to the form that the code should take, apart from pointing out
that some of its members favored the conclusion of a convention,
separate and distinct from the instrument establishing a multilateral
investment insurance scheme, while others favored the incorporation
of the principles in question into the basic agreement instituting the
insurance scheme. 80
A recent statement of the International Association for the Promo-
78. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE. Preliminary
Statement of Views submitted to the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (Document No. I 11/ 114,
4 May 1962, mimeo.).
79. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT INSURANCE 46 (1962).
8o. See also text accompanying notes 136-7 infra.
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tion and Protection of Private Foreign Investment (APPI) also gave
strong support to the idea of an international investment code. 0 The
Association stressed unequivocally the direct causal relation which
according to it exists between the lack of security of investments and
the relative lag in the flow of private foreign capital to the under-
developed areas. With reference to the need for the establishment of
confidence in the security of investments, it stated: "It is because these
conditions have been absent, and due to unfavourable political trends
and other non-commercial risks encountered, that private capital has
not-moved sufficiently to those areas where it is most needed .. "
The Association further expressed its conviction that confidence in the
security of private foreign investments "would be most effectively pro-
moted by the conclusion of a multilateral convention embodying on
a basis of strict reciprocity generally accepted principles of conduct
towards foreign property." These principles were listed as being the
right to just and non-discriminatory treatment, "the observance of
contractual agreements entered into and of assurances made by States,"
that expropriations should be carried out in accordance with due proc-
ess of law, in the absence of contrary agreements or assurances, and
with the prompt payment of effective and full compensation, and that
any disputes relating to these principles should be resolved by arbitra-
tion or by an international tribunal.
The matter of a multilateral investment code was also considered
recently by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. This
body had dealt with these problems in the past and had recommended
the initiation of discussions with a view to the conclusion of a conven-
tion between European and African states embodying an investment
statute and establishing an investment guarantee fund.8 2 The As-
sembly's recommendations were not acted upon by the Council of Min-
isters, which is the executive organ of the Council of Europe. In
January 1962, a motion for a recommendation was tabled in the
Consultative Assembly; s3 the matter was then studied by the Assem-
bly's Legal Committee which issued a report containing the text of a
draft recommendation and an explanatory memorandum by the Com-
mittee's rapporteur 8 4 The memorandum, as well as the draft recom-
mendation (which was later adopted by the Assembly with a few amend-
ments),8 5 dealt not only with the proposals for an investment code, but
81. ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE D'kTUDES POUR LA PROMOTION ET LA PROTECTION
DES INVESTISSEMENTS PRIVIS EN TERRITOIRES kTRANGERS, STATEMENT OF THE AIMS AND
ACTIVITIES OF THE APPI (Document 12/62, 16 July 1962, mimeo.). For some other
indications on the APPI, see GUARANTEES 79-80.
82. See CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT [hereinafter cited CONS. Ass. Doc.]
1027, September 8, 1959, and CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDATION 211 (1959).
For a discussion of the relevant proposals, see GUARANTEES 76-78.
83. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1402, January 17, 1962.
84. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962.
8 5 . CONS. Ass. RECOMMENDATION 317 (1962), May 17, 1962.
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also with those relating to a multilateral investment guarantee fund
and to the establishment of a system for the arbitration of investment
disputes. The memorandum examined in some detail the existing
means and programs for the promotion of foreign investment (bilateral
treaties, investment guarantees and investment laws) as well as the
various proposals for multilateral action. It then went on to suggest
that a solution to the problem of investment protection should be
sought by pursuing concurrently all three approaches: code, guarantee
and compulsory arbitration. In his discussion of the problems of an
investment code, the rapporteur showed himself to be fully aware of
the difficulties involved; he pointed out, among other things, that while
there may be some agreement on certain general principles regarding
the treatment of foreign property, difficulties were bound to arise
whenever these principles were to be applied to particular cases. He
stated, however, that the establishment of a compulsory arbitration
system would eliminate this difficulty.8 6 The precise conclusions of the
memorandum on the question of an investment code are somewhat
unclear. The memorandum quotes at length, with apparent approval,
the detailed provisions on the taking of property of the most recent
Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens.87 It further agrees with the view that an
investment code should include provisions stating the rights-not only
the obligations-of host countries. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Draft Convention is then sum-
marized, without any extensive discussion of its contents. But the draft
recommendation, which was later adopted by the Consultative Assem-
bly,8 states unequivocally and without qualifications that,
the member Governments should actively support the work of OECD
for the preparation and conclusion of an international convention
for re-affirming the general rules of international law for the protection
of foreign property and should seek to obtain the adherence to such a
convention by both capital-supplying and capital-receiving states.
An interesting comment on the Legal Committee's report was of-
fered by the Consultative Assembly's Economic Committee.8 9 This
Committee expressed its support for a "regional" approach which
would involve the creation of several separate systems, grouping "coun-
tries with common interests." The explanatory memorandum of the
rapporteur of the Economic Committee expressed a rather negative
attitude concerning the advisability or possibility of concluding a mul-
tilateral convention embodying rules of good conduct toward foreign
investors, either in conjunction with a multilateral investment guaran-
86. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 31, 33.
87. Article 1o; 55 AM. J. INT'L. L. 548, 553 (196).
88. Supra note 85.
89. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1429, May 8, 1962.
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tee scheme, or by itself. Nonetheless, the Economic Committee also
supported the Legal Committee's recommendation to the member
states.90
The most important of the recent efforts in support of a multilateral
investment code-important both because of its official character and
because of the concrete form it has taken-is the Draft Convention on
the Protection of Foreign Property prepared under the auspices of the
OECD. The initial proposal on the matter had come from the German
and Swiss governments who had suggested to the European Payments
Union that it examine the feasibility of such a convention and had
submitted two draft texts.9 ' The matter was taken up by the Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation, the OECD's predecessor,
late in 1957. Since that time, both the staff of the OECD and delegates
from some of the member countries (chiefly, the Western European
ones) have worked on the preparation of a final text. At the time of
writing, this text had been prepared, though not made public. It was
to be discussed at the fall session of the OECD's Council, and some
action was expected to be taken.
The OECD Draft Convention appears to limit itself to the prin-
ciples found in the recent APPI statement summarized above. The
parties undertake not to discriminate against foreign investors, to abide
by their agreements with or assurances to them, and to take expropria-
tory measures only in accordance with the "traditional" legal rules on
the matter: in the public interest, without discrimination, and with
full, prompt and effective compensation. These provisions do not
appear to be qualified or limited in any manner, except by a general
clause permitting temporary measures in derogation of the convention
in cases of grave public emergency or in accordance with United
Nations decisions and recommendations. While provisions concern-
ing exchange control and restrictions were the core of the Swiss gov-
ernment's draft,92 the final text of the convention is reported to contain
only a vague recommendation stating the desirability of freedom of
transfer of the earnings from foreign investments and of the principal in
case of liquidation of the enterprise. However, no specific undertaking is
included. Neither are any specific undertakings included with regard
to the absence of restrictions on the economic activities of aliens,
whether on the acquisition of property, the establishment of enter-
prises or the employment of personnel of foreign nationality. The con-
vention's only other major provision relates to the procedure to be
followed in case of dispute as to the interpretation or application of
go. The parts of the reports and recommendation relating to the investment
guarantee fund and to the establishment of an arbitration system are discussed
infra.
91. GUARANTEEs 78, 80-83.
92. GUARANTEEs 78, 154.
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the convention. This provision will be discussed again at a later point;
for present purposes, we may note that such procedure would be open
to private parties only by virtue of an optional (and revocable) declara-
tion to that effect by each state party to the convention. The present
proposals seem to envisage a convention which would be signed first
by the member states of the OECD, but would be open to all other
states.
It is difficult to assess the value of the proposed convention on the
basis of the limited information available and in the absence of any final
decision by the competent organs of the Organization. Only certain
general observations, relating to this type of convention rather than
to the particular draft itself, may be made.
When one compares the ground covered by the OECD Draft Con-
vention with that covered by the other texts proposed in the past four-
teen years commencing with the International Chamber of Commerce's
Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investors, one is struck by the
progressive limitation of the matters with which the convention is
dealing. Apart from the question of settlement of disputes, the OECD
Draft Convention is concerned with virtually a single aspect of the
whole problem of the security of foreign investments: the taking of
property, or cancellation of contracts, by measures amounting to ex-
propriation, whether formally presented as such or not. The same trend
toward elimination of "non-essentials" is apparent in the text of the
provisions which now tend to state general rules with almost no
qualifications or exceptions. These limitations on the proposed codes'
subject matter are not, of course, accidental. They stem from a con-
viction that the inclusion of additional matters or details would tend
to increase the difficulty of the adoption of the convention by a con-
siderable number of states and would ultimately undermine its effec-
tiveness.9 3 The validity of this point of view, however, is open to
question, even if it is assumed that the feasibility and desirability of
an investment code have been proved.94
It is not clear whether the proposed code is to be a restatement of
existing international law rules or a statement of new, or partly new,
principles designed to provide security to foreign investors 5 If it were
to be the former, it may be argued that the inclusion of provisions on
matters not settled by the already existing rules is not indicated. It is
93. See, e.g., Brandon, Recent Measures to Improve the International Investment
Climate, 9 J. PUB. L. 125, 128 (196o); Brandon, Survey of Current Approaches to the
Problem, in THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1, 11 (1962); Lauterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection
of Investment, id. j8, 26-27.
94. It is submitted that they have not; for some related arguments, see GUARANTEES
87-92; Proehl, Private Investments Abroad, 9 J. PUB. L. 362 (196o).
95. See on this point the cogent comments of Schwarzenberger, The Abs-Shawcross
Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A Critical Comment, 9 J. PUB. L. 147, 149
(196o). Cf. GUARANTEES 137; Lauterpacht, supra note 93, at 26.
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obvious, however, that the need for a code arises precisely because the
international law rules on the matter are not certain, so that any dif-
ference would be one of degree. Furthermore, it does not seem that
the proposed codes limit themselves to statements of rules which can be
considered as generally accepted. Thus, with respect to contractual un-
dertakings, they seem to be going much further than any customary
rule on the matter.96
Furthermore, it may be questioned whether a code limited to the
statement of general rules concerning expropriation or cancellation
of state contracts would really be an effective instrument for the pro-
tection of foreign investors. Assuming that such a convention is form-
ally adopted by a considerable number of states, capital-importing as
well as capital-exporting, is it to be expected that its existence will
affect the incidence of expropriations or other similar measures? The
convention will probably constitute a deterrent with respect to takings
which are not related to radical changes in the host country's economic
or political structure, takings which are manifestations of domestic
political difficulties or impatient acts of governments too hasty to
undertake long negotiations. However, the majority of takings of for-
eign property in the last fifty years have not been of this type. They
have been closely connected with radical changes in a county's political
regime or economic system; they have followed the achievement of
national independence, the overthrow of a feudal or dictatorial regime,
or the establishment of a communist regime. Would the existence of
an investment convention have made an important difference in any
of these cases? It seems more probable that specific diplomatic action
by the states concerned, whether or not in concert, is a far more effec-
tive means for influencing the policies of new regimes. Such action can
combine negative and positive elements by threatening economic or
other sanctions and at the same time offering economic assistance; an in-
vestment code only confronts the government of the host country with
an abstract negative rule.
These considerations would not apply with the same force to a con-
vention including provisions on matters of exchange control, freedom
of aliens to engage in economic activities, or employment of foreign
personnel. The related measures are, in a sense, commonplace; they
are not necessarily related to a radical change of economic structure
(although, of course, they may be on occasion) and when taken indi-
vidually, are generally not of a very high order of importance to the
country concerned (although again they may be on occasion). Such
measures can seriously affect the interests of foreign investors; they may
cause serious detriment to them and serve to discourage investments
in less developed countries. Moreover, from the viewpoint of public
96. See Lauterpacht, supra note 93, at 29.
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international law, these matters fall unquestionably within the tradi-
tional field of domestic jurisdiction of a state. In the absence of special
circumstances, therefore, a state is free to act in any way it sees fit. The
foreign investor must submit to such measures with little possibility
of seeking redress through the diplomatic intervention of his state of
nationality. It would seem then, that with respect to such matters
international regulation through a bilateral or multilateral conven-
tion would be useful, even though the conclusion of such a treaty is
bound to be a difficult undertaking. In fact, it has been argued else-
where that the provisions of the United States FCN treaties on these
matters are far more useful and effective than those dealing with pro-
tection of property from expropriation.97 On these grounds, there-
fore, it is submitted that the limitation of the draft convention's sub-
ject matter serves to limit significantly the protection that it may offer
to foreign investors. Moreover, it may well be argued that in their
present form the proposed texts deal only with matters which are well
established in the legal order of the developed countries, so that the
existence or absence of a treaty commitment really makes no difference.
Most commitments which might impose some obligation on, or limit
to some extent, the freedom of action of the governments of such
countries are avoided. The proposed texts would contain no commit-
ments on exchange restriction with respect to which the developed
countries prefer to keep their freedom of action (their interests-or
prejudices-in this instance coinciding with those of the less developed
nations). Nor would there be any provision on admission or employ-
ment of aliens which might conflict with established immigration or
other policies.
Another limitation upon the effectiveness of a convention con-
sisting of general rules regarding non-discrimination, expropriation
and cancellation of contracts lies in the very generality of the rules
and the lack of any delimitation of their application. It is evident that
"prompt and effective compensation" cannot mean simply and in
all cases cash payment in United States dollars. It is submitted that the
effectiveness of a convention would be increased if the relevant pro-
visions were more detailed and if it were clearly established under
what conditions payment by instalments or by earmarking certain
foreign currency receipts would be acceptable. It would help, too, if
the rule that a state should respect its undertakings toward aliens were
stated in detailed, precise and adequately qualified terms, making
clear under what conditions it is applicable, under what conditions
an undertaking might be varied and the possible effects of such action.
Even more, a general prohibition of discriminatory treatment would
have greater efficacy if it were followed by some explanatory provisions
97. GUARANTEES 218-22, 227-28.
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and possibly an illustrative list of such measuresYs It is always difficult
to decide how much detail should be included in a text such as this;
surely, the excessive detail of a municipal statute should be avoided.
But going to the other extreme results in a text which either is as rigid
and incapable of adjustment to concrete necessities as it appears to be at
first glance, or which will have to be broadly and freely construed when
applied. In the latter case, however, the lack of certainty which was
supposed to be eliminated would in fact persist.
Details and qualifications of the sort just mentioned would serve
not only to clarify the meaning of the provisions of the convention,
but also to help remove the suspicions of the governments of under-
developed countries who would be confronted otherwise with a text
stating their obligations without mentioning their rights or even the
exact limits of these obligations. This defect is common to most of
the proposed investment codes, although it is in no way a necessary
feature of such instruments. It is difficult to understand why an invest-
ment code should not contain certain provisions stating the powers of
the host country with respect to the regulation of foreign investment
and the corresponding obligations of the foreign investors and perhaps
of their country of nationality as well. It is true that to state the obli-
gation of private persons (the investors) in an international instrument
might not impose these obligations on them automatically (even
though this is by no means certain). However, it would be easy to
incorporate these terms in the particular instruments which may be
concluded between governments and foreign investors. Even in the
absence of such instruments, it seems more satisfactory to have each
particular rule articulated in detail so that, for instance, the obliga-
tion of the state to respect its commitments is followed by a provision
imposing on the investor in certain circumstances the duty to conduct
negotiations (in accordance with certain procedures which would have
to be laid down).
It remains to be seen whether a considerable number of states will
ever agree on principle to adopt an investment code and, once such
agreement is reached, whether they will accept a specific text. The
OECD Draft Convention was prepared, it is true, at a more official
level than any of the other drafts, but it has yet to achieve full accept-
ance, in principle and in detail, from all the member states of the
OECD. The attitude of the United States government toward all efforts
for the conclusion of a multilateral convention-code has been openly
negative. This attitude is to be attributed in part to a traditional pref-
erence for pragmatic solutions of concrete problems as they arise,
rather than for a priori statements of general rules. It is also due to a
belief in the ultimate futility of efforts to achieve a consensus of opinion
98. Such a list was included in the recent treaty between Pakistan and the Federal
Republic of Germany; see text accompanying note 48, supra.
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on matters relating to property and the treatment of aliens and a
consequent apprehension that the inauguration of official discussions
on such matters might lead to increased rigidity in the attitudes of
other countries on such matters.99 There is no indication that the
attitude of the United States on the matter, which seems to be shared
by some other countries, such as Canada, has in any way changed.
Despite the increased vitality and importance of the Western Euro-
pean countries today, it seems improbable that they would proceed
to formally adopt a convention such as the one proposed by the OECD
in the knowledge that the United States is not going to participate.
It would appear, therefore, that in spite of the undeniable advance of
the code idea in recent years, its general adoption is still uncertain.
V. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE
During the past year, much attention has been devoted to the pos-
sibility of the institution of a multilateral investment guarantee pro-
gram. Suggestions to this effect had been made in the past by several
agencies and individuals, 100 but the idea came forcefully to public
attention after the initiation last year of a study by the World Bank.
The request for the study (which the Bank was already considering
making) came from the Development Assistance Group (now the
Development Assistance Committee) of the OECD in 1961. The World
Bank agreed to undertake the study, and a staff report dealing with the
problems of multilateral investment insurance was published in March,
1962.10' In it, the Bank expresses no opinion or preference concerning
the creation or the form of such a program. The report carefully and
impartially examines the pros and cons of each particular aspect of
the problem, leaving it to the reader to draw his own conclusions.
Since the publication of the Bank's report, two other documents
issued by international bodies have dealt with the same subject and
commented on the Bank report. In May, a committee of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce issued a preliminary statement of views
on the matter.0 2 The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe
also considered the matter, and its Legal and Economic Committees
99. See, on this point, Metzger, Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of
Private Foreign Investment, 9 J. PUB. L. 133, 143-46 (196o). Cf. Johnson, Comment
in THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
35 (1962); Gardner, International Measures for the Promotion and Protection of
Foreign Investments, 53 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 255, 259-62 (1959).
ioo. An analysis of the numerous proposals and suggestions is contained in
Annex B of the World Bank report, cited infra note 1o, at 3o-37.
101. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT INSURANCE A STAFF REPORT (1962) (hereinafter cited as IBRD REP.)
For a summary presentation of its contents, see Broches, International Investment
Guaranties: Possibilities and Problems, 56 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 81 (1962).
102. Supra note 78.
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have issued reports discussing some of the related problems.10 3 Up to
the time of writing, however, the OECD, whose Development Assist-
ance Group had requested the report, has made no official comment.
The World Bank report is based on a study of the three national
investment guarantee programs now in operation, the various proposals
for a multilateral program, and the answers to a questionnaire pre-
pared jointly by the World Bank and the International Chamber of
Commerce and sent, through the latter's National Committees, to
firms and business associations in both capital-importing and capital-
exporting countries. However, a relatively small number of firms and
associations sent back replies to the questionnaire, so that its results
cannot be considered as necessarily expressing the views of the majority
of businessmen.1 0 4
The report examines first the incentive effect of investment insur-
ance. It points out that the effect varies with the kind of investment
involved: a firm which depends largely on availability of raw materials
will have to invest abroad, whether insurance is available or not. This
may not be true of a manufacturing concern which does not have to
start operations abroad. The fact that an increasing number of firms
are taking advantage of the existing national guarantee programs is
in itself not sufficient to prove that these firms would not have invested
if insurance was not available. Successive surveys of investor opinion
have failed to show that a large number of investments would not
have been made if insurance had not been available.105 An indication
to the same effect can be drawn from the answers to the Bank's ques-
tionnaire, although the numbers involved are too small to permit any
definite conclusions. 0 The report points out further that the opera-
tion of a guarantee program may influence the direction of foreign
investment away from the countries which do not participate in it, but
without any increase in the overall total of foreign investment. More-
over, the availability of investment insurance may work to the ad-
vantage of countries pursuing inflationary policies. The investor would
be able to derive high profits as a consequence of such policies with-
out at the same time risking his initial investment, whose security or
repatriation he has insured. The discussion in the report ends on a
note of uncertainty: "That some further investment would be stimu-
lated is surely likely; it cannot be said with assurance whether the
volume would justify the undertaking." 107 And further, "the sound-
ness of the conclusion that an improvement in the investment climate
103. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962 (Report of Legal Committee);
CONS. Ass. Doc. 1429, May 8, 1962 (Opinion of Economic Committee).
104. Cf. IBRD REP. 38.
105. Id. at 4-5; Mikesell, in U.S. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT ABROAD
212-14 (Mikesell ed., 1962).
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can be tested only pragmatically; it is not presently capable of demon-
stration." 108
In its comment on the World Bank report, the Commission on
Foreign Investments and Economic Development of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) deals at some length with this aspect of
the problem. It recognizes that "this is not a question upon which any
factual evidence can be produced conclusively pointing one way or
the other," but goes on to express its feeling "that a more positive
reply can be given." 109 According to the Commission, the replies to
the questionnaire show that "political risks," in a broad sense, "con-
stitute if not the major, at any rate a major, obstacle to investment in
the developing areas. Any method of protecting the investor effectively
against such risks, including the method of insurance, must therefore
have a substantial effect on the international movement of private
capital." 110 As to the possibility that an insurance scheme might divert
investments toward unstable but profitable economies, the Commis-
sion states that it "does not believe it to be in the least likely that
reputable business firms would deliberately risk their properties" in
such a manner, and it observes that apart from the availability of insur-
ance, other factors are taken into account by the investing firms."'
The ICC comment also refers to the possibility that the insurance fund
may be able to limit its commitments in such situations; however, this
would in practice raise a number of problems which the World Bank
report mentions with some apprehension." 2
The ICC Commission's statement further supports the creation of
a multilateral insurance program because of the need for establishing
a broad system of cooperation between private investors and govern-
ments, of which the insurance program would be a "central element,"
and which would help in bringing about "the climate of confidence
and understanding between developed and developing countries which
is a sine qua non condition of peaceful progress." 113
The report of the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe Con-
sultative Assembly did not deal with this aspect of the problem, apart
from quoting a related statement from the World Bank's report." 4
The Assembly's Economic Committee, however, examined the ques-
tion further. The rapporteur noted the Bank's "pessimistic conclusion"
but he disputed its validity in the case of a guarantee fund operating
1o8. Ibid. 6; and cf. Broches, supra note ioi, at 85-86.
1o9. Supra note 78, para. 6-7.
11o. Supra note 78, para. 7.
iii. Ibid.
112. See IBRD REP. 18-1 9.
113. Supra note 78, para. 8.
114. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 46(a) and appendix.
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in the context of the "regional approach" which his report advocates. 115
He, too, found the plan's justification resting on broader considerations:
Thus it is the problem as a whole which must be considered when
judging the stimulating effect upon private investment and not its
isolated elements no matter what their intrinsic value, because each
member benefits from the effect of there being other members, and all
contribute to the creation and improvement of a favourable climate
for private investments. 116
The second main part of the World Bank's report deals with some
of the specific problems of a multilateral investment insurance pro-
gram. It discusses in detail the questions relating to the scope of pro-
tection-what risks are to be covered by the insurance scheme." 7 It
points out that different considerations apply to each of the three
main risks covered today by the existing national guarantee programs.
In the case of insurance against war or insurrection, the guarantee
relates to action which does not depend (or depends to a very minor
extent) on the host government's attitude or measures. In the case
of convertibility insurance, some action by the host government is in-
volved, but its taking would depend in the majority of cases on the
general condition of the economy and of the country's foreign ex-
change resources; the action itself would, in most cases, be directed
against all transfers and not only those of foreign investors. In the case
of insurance against expropriation, on the other hand, the guarantee
covers governmental action which is likely to be directed either against
the investor himself or against foreign investors as a class. The role
of investment insurance will, therefore, vary in accordance with the
risk involved. With regard to the expropriation guarantee, insurance
plays not only a compensatory function, but also a deterrent one: its
existence may affect the host government's decision whether or not to
expropriate the foreign investor's property. With regard to the con-
vertibility guarantee, such deterrent function is almost non-existent,
and it is certainly absent in the case of the war-risk guarantee." 8
Serious problems arise with respect to the scope of the guarantee
against expropriation-the "political risk" in the World Bank's terms.
Such a guarantee may conceivably cover a wide variety of govern-
mental action which would result in the taking of the investor's prop-
erty or the deprivation of substantial expected benefits. Discriminatory
action would probably have to be covered, but disputes may well arise
115. See text accompanying notes 89-go supra.
I16. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1429, May 8, 1962, para. 17.
117. IBRD REP. 7-13.
118. On the deterrent function of guarantees, see the observations in VON NEU-
MANN WHITMAN, THE UNITED STATES INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAM AND PRIVATE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT i8-ig (Princeton Studies in International Finance, 1959).
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as to what constitutes discrimination in a given situation. Too broad
a definition of the risk would result in a high potential of successful
claims and may also raise objections on the part of the capital-import-
ing countries as involving a limitation of their freedom of action in
domestic economic affairs. The existing national guarantee programs
have resolved this problem in different ways. Under the United States
program, the scope of the protection is defined neither in the inter-
national agreements instituting the program, nor in the basic legislative
instruments to which such agreements refer. The only operative
definition of "expropriation" is included in the contract between the
insuring agency (now the AID) and the investor and, of course, is
binding only as between the two parties.11 In a multilateral insurance
program, however, a definition would have to be agreed upon by all
participating countries. Under the German investment guarantee pro-
gram, definitions of the actions against which insurance is available
are included in the text of the related intergovernmental agreements.1 20
Such a method seems more appropriate to a multilateral program, al-
though it is uncertain whether the participating countries can reach
an agreement on the subject.
The preliminary statement of the International Chamber of Com-
merce deals briefly with these problems; it insists on the need for a
guarantee covering all indirect methods of taking ("creeping expropria-
tion"). As to the scope of protection of the other guarantees, it agrees
with the World Bank report that currency devaluation should be
excluded from the transfer guarantee, and natural calamities from the
guarantee against war, insurrection and other man-made calamities.1 21
Similar, though not as clear, views are found in the report of the Legal
Committee of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly.122 The
relevant paragraphs are chiefly devoted to summaries of the main pro-
posals on the matter; it is not clear whether the rapporteur favors the
inclusion of currency devaluation under the transfer risk. The detailed
earlier report of the Assembly's Economic Committee 123 had excluded
both currency devaluation and natural calamities from the risks the
guarantee fund would cover.
The World Bank report also examines the possibility of substituting
a single new risk for all those covered by the existing national pro-
grams.1 24 One of the proposals studied by the Bank had suggested that
investors should be insured only against the failure of the host govern-
119. GUARANTEES 108-I 1.
i2o. See text accompanying notes 48, 49 and 51 supra.
121. Supra note 78, para. 20-22.
122. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 36-46.
123. Report on an Investment Statute and a Guarantee Fund against Political
Risks, CONS. Ass. Doc. 1027, Sept. 8, 1959, pp. 24-27. The then proposed fund
would include only European and African states; see GUARANTEES 115-16.
124. IBRD REP. 10-12.
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ment to arbitrate a dispute with the particular investor or to abide by
the award of an arbitration tribunal.125 In this manner, no problems of
general definitions of the risks would arise nor any dispute as to the
interpretation of such definitions; each case could be dealt with on its
merits by the arbitral tribunal. The only prerequisite would be that
the countries participating in the insurance program bind themselves
to submit disputes with private investors to arbitration. On the other
hand, such a system would involve delays and uncertainties which
would probably be absent if the risks were determined more specifi-
cally. And, of course, the difficulty remains that governments, up to
now, have shown no eagerness to submit investment disputes to arbi-
tration. If, however, this basic difficulty is eliminated and there is some
progress toward a system of arbitration and conciliation of investment
disputes, it may be necessary to reconsider the feasibility of a guarantee
program along these lines. If some of the delays and uncertainties that
it entails were eliminated or diminished, it might become more accept-
able to prospective foreign investors.
Almost all of the related proposals, as well as at least two of the three
national guarantee programs in operation, provide for insuring only
new investments. The World Bank report examines the arguments
for and against this practice, and it concludes that, aside from any the-
oretical argument, "a program whose benefits extended to existing in-
vestments would call for capital commitments of such magnitude as
probably to be impracticable." 126 The ICC's preliminary statement
fully accepts the validity of this argument. While expressing regret that
not all investments, old and new alike, can be insured, it finds that the
inclusion of existing investments would be "totally impracticable" and
would result in an "unbearable" burden of liability for the insuring
body.127 In discussing the problems of the eligibility of investments, the
Legal Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope suggested that the governing body of the proposed guarantee fund
should be given some discretion to decide whether a particular invest-
ment should be guaranteed. To this end, certain general criteria should
be laid down.'2 8 The opposite course of action is strongly supported in
the World Bank's report, according to which it is highly desirable that
the issuance of insurance be made "as automatic and non-discretionary
as possible." 129 The report stresses the difficulties which the fund's
125. AVANT-PROPOS DE STATUT DU FONDS INTERNATIONAL DE GARANTIE DES IN-
VESTISSMENTS PRIVES ]ETRANGERS (June 1961), submitted by M. Reyre, Managing
Director, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. The proposal is summarized in the
IBRD REP. 30-37, and in the report of the Legal Committee of the Council of
Europe Consultative Assembly, CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, passim.
126. IBRD REP. 13.
127. Supra note 78, para. 19, 25 (d).
128. CONS. Ass. Doc. 14i9 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 43(ii).
129. IBRD REP. 19.
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governing body would have to face if it had to make choices between
investments, industries or countries.130 There is unanimous agreement,
however, on the need for the consent of the country of investment as a
prerequisite for the issuance of the guarantee. 131
The World Bank's report also discusses in some detail the proposed
scope of membership of an international insurance program. Three dis-
tinct solutions are possible: first, a program in which both capital-im-
porting and capital-exporting countries participate; second, a program
instituted by all capital-exporting countries; and third, a program in-
stituted, or at least initiated, by a group of capital-exporting countries.
The Bank does not express a preference on the matter, but both the
International Chamber of Commerce 132 and the committees of the
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 133 strongly support
the first of these solutions. Indeed, the participation of capital-re-
ceiving countries in the program and their sharing the risk of loss
are perhaps the most important considerations in favor of a multi-
lateral investment insurance scheme. It is hoped that such participation
in the risks as well as the advantages of the program will induce the
governments of capital-receiving countries to avoid the very actions
against which the guarantees are issued. Moreover, it may lead some of
the capital-importing countries to exercise pressure on those of their
number who might be inclined to take such action. On the other hand,
as the World Bank's report points out, 3 4 there is little incentive for the
participation of capital-importing countries in such a program since
under the existing national programs, these countries derive whatever
benefits are to be derived from the programs' operation without sharing
the risks. A multilateral program should, therefore, possess other con-
siderable advantages in order to induce such countries to undertake to
bear a share of the risk. The report stresses in this connection the need
for more information on the attitude of the capital-receiving countries'
governments. It should be noted, moreover, that the deterrent effect
of a multilateral program is of some importance only with respect to the
"political risk;" it is of little significance as regards the transfer risk,
and probably of none in the case of the calamity risk.lm5
The staff report of the World Bank concludes with a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of a multilateral program. On the positive
side should be mentioned the simplification in administration which
a multilateral program would involve, the fact that such a program is
130. Id. at 14, 18.
131. Id. at 13; CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 43 (iii); CONS. Ass.
Doc. 1429, May 8, 1962, para. 26(ii).
132. Supra note 78, para. 8, 11, 12, 25(a).
133. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 45(i); CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419,May 8, 1962 passim; and cf. CONS. Ass. RECOMMENDATION 317 (1962).
134. IBRD REP. 15, 20-21.
135. See text accompanying note i18 supra.
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more appropriate to joint investments by nationals of several countries
(a practice which is on the increase) and the wider distribution of the
risk of loss. On the negative side may be mentioned the difficulties in-
volved in the negotiation of an agreement instituting an insurance pro-
gram. Futhermore, difficult problems would arise where the multilat-
eral insurance agency has paid on a loss and attempts to recover the sums
paid from the host country involved. National investment guarantee
programs possess considerable advantages in such situations.
A much disputed point is whether the institution of a multilateral
investment insurance program should be linked with adoption by all
participating countries of a set of rules of conduct toward foreign invest
ment. Business organizations strongly favor this course of action. The
International Chamber of Commerce goes so far as to state that, in the
view of some of its members, the entire insurance scheme should be
dropped if no code of treatment of investors is combined with it.ls6 Al-
though this does not represent the general consensus of opinion of ICC
members, the inclusion of an investment code is still considered one of
the most desirable features of an effective investment insurance pro-
gram.137 Some indication of investor opinion may also be derived from
the replies to the questionnaire prepared by the World Bank and the
International Chamber of Commerce. 13 It is interesting to note further
that of the twelve proposals for a multilateral investment insurance
program by individuals or organizations which the World Bank report
summarizes, only two consider the inclusion of a code of rules of con-
duct as a necessary feature of the program. Four of the proposals do
not deal with this matter at all, while the rest accept the desirability of
such a code in terms of varying strength' 3 9
The reports of the Legal and Economic Committees of the Council of
Europe Consultative Assembly are illustrative of existing differences of
opinion in approaching to the problem. The Legal Committee generally
favors the enactment of a code of good conduct, even though realizing
the difficulties involved.140 According to it, one of the advantages of a
multilateral investment insurance program is that it will make possible
the otherwise difficult conclusion of a convention embodying a code of
good conduct toward foreign investors.' 4' The Economic Committee,
on its part, does not dispute the desirability of such a code but, being
more impressed with the practical difficulties, suggests that the invest-
ment guarantee scheme be dissociated from the proposed code in order
to increase the former's chances of success. 1 42
136. Supra note 78, para. 15.
137. Id. at para. 15, 25(c).
138. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
139. IBRD RP. 36-37.
140. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
141. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 41.
142. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1429, May 8, 1962, para. 14.
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The World Bank report clearly states the two points of view: on the
one hand, it may well be that a capital-receiving country might be will-
ing to accept an agreement on the treatment of foreign investors as the
price for participating in the insurance program; on the other hand,
and in view of the difficulties which the negotiation of such a code
would involve, "it is certainly possible that, so far from facilitating
agreement, the result of coupling the insurance scheme with a proposal
for an investment code would be the realization of neither." 143
Most of the proposals considered by the World Bank in preparation
of its report suggest that the administration of the mutilateral insurance
scheme to be adopted should be in the hands of the World Bank itself
or of an affiliate of the Bank. 44 The staff report itself does not dis-
cuss this question, but an important remark on it is contained in the
short Preface to the report by the World Bank's president. He points
out that a discussion of this matter would be premature, since certain
other basic issues (such as the nature of the program, the scope of
membership and, indeed, whether to go ahead with the program itself)
would have to be decided. He goes on to state, however, that "any pro-
posal that the Bank administer such a program would be likely to raise
for the Bank a number of difficult issues, having to do principally with
the compatibility of that responsibility with the other and primary
functions of the Bank." 14 This is a timely warning; the undeniable suc-
cess of the Bank in its operations as a lending institution has led several
commentators to suggest that it extend its activities to more and more
fields, without considering that the Bank's success is certainly due in
part to the limited and relatively non-political character of its activities.
Increased responsibilities of a political character may well work a dis-
service on the Bank and deprive it of its present position as an impartial
and independent body whose advisory or political activities are clearly
subsidiary to its main role. It may be preferable to avoid burdening the
Bank with additional administrative responsibilities so that it may re-
tain its present position and thus be able to serve as an impartial con-
ciliator of, rather than a party to, investment disputes.
The staff report of the World Bank on multilateral investment insur-
ance is a document of considerable importance. Although the report
does not draw any conclusions as to the advisability of attempting to
create a program of this sort, the reader is struck by the number and
importance of the difficulties that the creation of such a program in-
143. IBRD REP. 21.
144. See, e.g., IBRD REP. 34-35. In its preliminary statement of views, the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce Commission on Foreign Investments and Eco-
nomic Development reiterates "its own firmly held view" that the administration
of the proposed guarantee fund should be "in the hands either of the World Bank
itself, should this prove compatible with its other functions, or of some specially
created international institution operating under its aegis." Supra note 78, para. 26.
145. IBRD REP., Preface.
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volves. Not only is the participation of the capital-importing countries
in such a program quite doubtful, but even the initial agreement and
continuing cooperation of capital-exporting countries cannot be taken
as granted. A high degree of agreement on foreign investment policies
between the major capital-exporting countries is a prerequisite for the
institution and orderly operation of a multilateral investment insurance
program. Although these countries share certain common interests in
the security and expansion of private international investment and in
the development of the less developed countries within the framework
of a (more or less) democratic system of government, it is surely an over-
simplification to say that in no case is there any opposition between
their respective economic and political interests. This question will
have to be resolved before any effort is made to convince the capital-
receiving countries of the need for a multilateral program of invest-
ment insurance.
VI. AN INTERNATIONAL COURT FOR INVESTMENT DISPUTES?
The third method of multilateral action for the protection of
private foreign investment which is currently being explored is that
of the creation of international machinery for the settlement of invest-
ment disputes. Much attention has been given recently to the possibili-
ties of this method.146 Provision for the settlement of disputes forms
an integral part of virtually all investment code proposals; 147 in at
least one case, the establishment of an arbitration system is at the heart
of a proposed investment insurance scheme. 48 In many cases, the pro-
posed procedure stands by itself, with no code of rules of treatment
attached to it.149 Indeed, a certain evolution may be noted in some
proposals from the investment code approach to the investment court
approach or, in more technical terms, from the statement of sub-
stantive rules of law to the statement of adjective rules establishing
remedial procedures.
The argument in favor of this course of action is simple. A major
146. As in the rest of this article, only the most recent proposals and suggestions
are studied. For discussions of earlier proposals, see Sohn, Proposals for the Establish-
ment of a System of International Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION:
A ROAD TO WORLD-WIDE COOPERATION 63 (Domke ed., 1958); GUARANTEES 180-84;
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, The Promotion of the International
Flow of Private Capital. U.N. Sec. Gen. Rep. U.N. Doc. E/ 3 3 25, Feb. 26, 196o,
para. 2oo-o8; id. The Promotion of the International Flow of Private Capital, U.N.
Sec. Gen. Rep. U.N. Doc. E/ 3 4 9 2, May 18, 1961, para. 278-300. For an exhaustive
survey of recent proposals, see Domke, Arbitration Between Governmental Bodies
and Foreign Private Firms, 17 AB. J. 129 (1962).
147, See, e.g., the discussion on the OECD Draft Convention and cf. text ac-
companying note 157 infra.
148. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
149. There is in most cases, however, some provision on the applicable law, which
may be expanded to include such rules; see, e.g., text accompanying note 161 infra.
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cause of the investors' insecurity is the lack of an impartial judicial
body competent to decide disputes between investors and govern-
ments. The municipal courts of the host state are not always trusted
by the investors and, at any rate, are generally limited in their ability
to pass judgment over the acts of their government. Direct recourse to
the International Court of Justice is not possible, as long as the dispute
is confined to the investor and the state of investment, since that tribunal
deals only with disputes between states. 150 Apart from this fact, even if
the investor's state of nationality espouses his claim, the submission of
the dispute to the International Court of Justice may not be possible or
may involve long delays. For these reasons, most proposals provide for
the establishment of new judicial machinery by means of an inter-
national convention to be adopted by both capital-exporting and capital-
importing states. Such a convention will lay down the procedures to be
followed whenever a dispute arises between a state and a foreign in-
vestor.
The recent proposals do not suggest that a permanent body be
established, but rather that disputes should be judged by ad hoc
tribunals. The procedures for determining the composition of these
tribunals generally follow traditional international law lines. The
parties to a dispute appoint an equal number of members of the tri-
bunal, and these members appoint by common agreement an additional
member who usually presides over the tribunal. Provision is made
for the appointment of members of the tribunal by officials of an
impartial international body, such as the International Court of Justice,
in the cases where a party fails to appoint its member or members or
where no agreement is reached among the members appointed by the
parties on the person of the additional member. A variation of this
method consists in choosing beforehand a panel of arbitrators from
whose number must be chosen the members of the tribunal. A related
method is provided by the Rules of Arbitration recently promulgated
by the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. 15'
150. Professor Roger Fisher of Harvard has suggested an ingenious method of
getting around this difficulty: states might pass domestic legislation, allowing some
of their citizens to present claims before the ICJ as their "agents," subject to certain
conditions assuring the states' ultimate control. See Sohn, The Role of International
Institutions as Conflict-Adjusting Agencies, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 205, 218-19 (1961).
151. If the parties cannot agree on the choice of the arbitrators, either of them
may apply to the Bureau [of the Court] in order to solicit its co-operation in
that behalf.
In that case the Bureau shall submit to both parties an identical list con-
taining the names of persons whose number must be twice that of the arbitrators
to be appointed by the Bureau.
The parties shall return that list, indicating the names of those they would
be willing to accept and enumerating them in sequence of their preference.
On the basis of these lists the Bureau shall constitute the tribunal, selecting
persons whom both parties have deemed acceptable.
Rules 1962, § I, art. 5.
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A minor departure from the traditional methods of public inter-
national law is the mention in some proposals of the need for a spe-
cialized body of arbitrators, expert in international commercial and
business affairs.'5 2 The emphasis placed on this point varies; its im-
portance would seem to be limited as long as the prevailing views on
the applicable law and the purely judicial function of the tribunal
are accepted. Another far more important departure from traditional
principles is the insistence on procedures whereby not only states, but
the investors as well (who, as individuals, would have no standing in
traditional international law), are accorded access to the proposed tri-
bunals. It has already been noted that this is one of the chief reasons
for considering the available remedies before the International Court
of Justice as insufficient and ill-adapted to investment disputes. In some
proposals, the arbitration proceedings will not be open to private
persons unless the states concerned (both the state of investment and the
state of nationality) have consented by means of a previously filed op-
tional declaration. 15 3 Such a procedure would probably facilitate the
accession of a considerable number of states to the proposed conven-
tion. Still, it should be kept in mind that one of the essential justifica-
tions for the conclusion of such a convention is that it would afford
to private persons access to the tribunals to be established. In the ab-
sence of this feature, it would be somewhat more difficult to justify
the creation of new arbitral machinery.
The provisions of the recent proposals vary widely with respect to the
determination of the law to be applied by the proposed tribunals. The
Rules of 1962 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration repeat the
formula found in the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement
of Disputes, 5 4 according to which the tribunal "will decide on the
basis of respect for law" unless the parties agree to request a decision
ex aequo et bono.5 5 The Draft Statutes of the Arbitral Tribunal for
Foreign Investments submitted to the Brussels Conference of the In-
ternational Law Association by its Committee on the Juridical Aspects
The Rules further provide for appointment of the members of the tribunal by
the Secretary-General of the Court if no agreement between the parties is reached.
For the text of the Rules, see ARBITRALE RECHTSPRAAK No. 497, at 135 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as Rules 1962].
152. See, e.g., REPORT TO THE 1962 CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION, CoMMITTEE ON COURT AND COURT PROCEDURE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
INVESTMENTS ABROAD, at 3 (separate print) (K. Ehlers, rapporteur); and cf. Snyder,
Foreign Investment Protection: Is Institutional Arbitration an Answer? 40 N.C.L.
REV. 665, 688 (1962).
153. Cf., e.g., DRAFT STATUTES FOR THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL FOR FOREIGN INVEST-
MENTS (August 1961 version), ILA COMMiTTEE ON THE JURIDICIAL ASPECTS OF
NATIONALIZATION AND FOREIGN PROPERTY AT THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE (1962) (I.
Seidl-Hohenveldern, rapporteur), art. 4(2)(a); OECD Draft Convention, supra.
154. See 2 ScoTr, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 89 (art. 15
of the 1899 convention), 325 (art. 37 of the 1907 Convention) (19o9).
155. Rules 1962, supra note 151 § I, art. 30.
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of Nationalization and Foreign Property provide that the tribunal
"shall apply in the determination of the claim the proper law of the
contract as determined by the generally recognized principles of private
international law relating to choice of law in contract cases, unless the
parties request it to decide ex aequo et bono." 150 The report of the
Legal Committee of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly
refers in this connection to the principles to be established by the
Investment Statute whose adoption it supports.157 It also expresses the
hope that case law on the matter will be developed "interpreting the
general rules as applied to specific cases." It then goes on to state:
"Where no general rules exist and where the Parties specifically agree,
the tribunal would have to decide ex aequo et bono or on 'the general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations'. ... " 158 The report
further "reaffirms" certain "basic principles" applicable to such dis-
putes: equitable treatment of aliens; observance of undertakings given
to foreign investors and full reparation for any breach thereof; that
all expropriations should be in the public interest, without discrimina-
tion and subject to just and effective compensation; and finally, that
returns, proceeds or compensation should be freely transferable abroad,
subject to agreed derogations.'5 9 The draft resolution submitted to
the 1962 Conference of the International Bar Association by its Com-
mittee for Court and Court Procedure for the Protection of Investments
Abroad is more precise. It provides that:
The tribunal shall apply, in so far as questions of international law are
to be decided in a dispute, the recognized principles of international
law including those which were confirmed at the Cologne Conference
as existing principles of international law.160 In the case of disputes
arising out of contracts concluded between a convention state and a
national of another convention state, the tribunal must base its decision
on principles, amongst others, that the contract is the law of the parties
and pacta sunt servanda.'61
The diversity of the provisions in the various proposals is an indica-
tion of the importance and, at the same time, the difficulty of the ques-
156. Supra note 153, art. 4(2)(b).
157. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
158. CONS. Ass. Doc. 1419 (rev.), May 23, 1962, para. 49.
159. Ibid.
16o. The principles referred to were included in a proposed resolution sub-
mitted by the IBA's Committee on Protection of Investments Abroad in Time of
Peace (K. Ehlers, rapporteur) to the 1958 Cologne Conference of the IBA. See
INTERNATIONAL BAR AssOCIATION, SEVENTH CONFERENCE COLOGNE 1958, at 485 (1958).
The principles were that municipal law is subject to international law, that takings
of private property are internationally lawful when effected "by due process in
conformity with the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and
without discrimination" and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation,
and that "international law recognizes that the principle pacta sunt servanda
applies to the specific engagements of States towards other States or the Nationals of
other States and that in consequence a taking of private property in violation of a
specific state contract is contrary to international law."
161. Supra note 152, at io, para. 8.
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tion. In the case of investment disputes, it is not only a set of adjective
law rules or a competent judicial organ that are lacking. The substantive
rules of law, as well, are unclear and difficult to determine, if not in
some instances lacking. The rules of public international law are not
sufficient to solve the related problems; in many cases they seem hardly
relevant. Public international law may usefully provide a basic frame-
work and determine which actions are so extreme as to be considered
internationally unlawful. But it cannot provide the rules for the
solution of everyday problems, of disputes relating to the construction
of a contractual provision, the legitimacy and force of a request for
renegotiation or the effect of unforeseen changes on the continuing
operation of a particular enterprise. The references to the contract
as the law of the parties or to the principle pacta sunt servanda go nearer
to the heart of the problem, but cannot be considered fully appropriate
or sufficient. Disputes are likely to arise involving situations not pro-
vided for in the contract or with respect to which the contractual pro-
visions are held by one of the parties not to apply. There may be no
contract directly in issue, as in the case of measures which affect in-
directly the operation of an enterprise but which do not reach the
point where they constitute an outright taking. Some further clarifica-
tion of the applicable rules-the manner in which the contract is to be
construed or performed-is needed. The reference to the general
principles of law again seems relevant but lacking in precision. It is
submitted that it would be more useful to refer to rules or principles
applicable to situations closely resembling those likely to arise between
investors and host governments.
The latest Harvard Draft Convention on state responsibility refers,
with respect to state contracts, to the "principles recognized by the
principal legal systems of the world as applicable to governmental
contracts or concessions." 162 Such a provision constitutes a useful
starting point.163 It does not, of course, fully solve the existing problems.
It does not make the specific rules of law which are applicable in
particular situations clear, precise and certain. All it does, in fact, is
point to a certain direction. It has to be acknowledged that at the
present moment there are no certain and clear legal rules on the
matter. They will have to be created slowly, from case to case, in the
same manner in which the corresponding municipal law principles,
concerning state contracts or eminent domain, have developed over
the years. The existence of such municipal law rules and principles is,
of course, helpful; but it cannot be expected that these principles will
necessarily fit, without any change, the needs and conditions of the
less developed countries or of the relations between the governments
of these countries and foreign nationals. A considerable margin of
uncertainty is therefore inevitable.
162. Art. 12(1)(c); 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 567 (i961).
163. For a related discussion, see GUARANTEES 295-.96.
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The realization of this fact of contemporary international life raises
another related consideration. The proposals we are examining share
an emphasis on the judicial character of the organs whose establishment
they advocate. But it is open to question whether purely judicial bodies
are what is needed today for the solution of investment disputes. In
the absence of well-established legal rules, the task of such judicial
bodies will be extremely difficult. No doubt, they could overcome these
difficulties and, if given the chance, could proceed to the construction
of a body of case law. It may be doubted, however, whether the states
and investors concerned will be willing to give them this chance, in full
realization of the fact that the law to be applied is so uncertain and
imprecise as it is today. It has to be borne in mind that the subject
matter of the related disputes is often of vital concern to both parties.
It is doubtful whether either of the parties can afford to leave the
decision as to such matters to a purely judicial organ, whose task will
be to render a decision based on legal considerations, to the exclusion
of political or economic factors. Basically, the problems involved are
not legal; they relate to a demand for the change of existing condi-
tions, not to the "proper construction" of the terms of an arrangement.
In municipal law this would be a field for legislation; in the absence
of an international legislative organ it will have to be the domain of
compromise rather than clear-cut solutions for or against, of variations
between shades of gray rather than contrast between black and white.
In the traditional language of international law, what is chiefly (al-
though not exclusively) needed is a procedure for conciliation, rather
than for judicial settlement.
Of the proposals here discussed, some do mention conciliation pro-
cedures, although without placing great emphasis on them. One private
proposal goes further in this respect and suggests the creation of a
system of regional arbitral tribunals which are to decide cases ex aequo
et bono, as a rule, and only exceptionally in accordance with strict
law.164 It is submitted that once the necessity for a decision not based on
strict legal grounds is accepted, it is preferable not to retain the form
of arbitration but to adopt instead that of conciliation. It appears that
in the field of commercial arbitration (between private parties), as
well, more and more attention is being paid to conciliation "as a
necessary and valuable adjunct to arbitration." 165 It may be that
with respect to international investment disputes conciliation proce-
dures are more appropriate and, especially, more easily acceptable by
the parties, so that arbitration becomes the "valuable adjunct" to
conciliation. However that may be, it is evident that the possibilities
of setting up certain procedures for conciliation are well worth further
exploration.
164. Snyder, supra note 152, at 684-85, 688.
165 . Domke, The Bangkok Conference on Commercial Arbitration, 17 ARB. J.
23, 29 (1962).
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The main difference between conciliation and arbitration ex aequo
et bono is that in the latter case the arbitrators' decision is binding on
the parties, while in the former case it is not. In both cases the third
party's decision is not necessarily based on strict legal considerations
and may consist in a compromise between differing positions. It is
evident that such compromise will probably be founded on an
appreciation of the political, economic and other factors that may be
involved. In view of the non-binding character of the conciliators' "rec-
ommendations," it seems probable that a multilateral convention pro-
viding for mandatory conciliation procedures in case of investment
disputes may well be acceptable to several states that might not be pre-
pared to accept compulsory arbitration. Provision for arbitration, per-
haps not on a compulsory basis, may also be included in such an in-
strument.
It is submitted that such a convention would be both feasible and
desirable. It would provide a minimum of order by assuring that the
parties to a dispute will be brought together and that an impartial
third party would be given the opportunity to study the situation,
define the issues in dispute and suggest mutually profitable arrange-
ments. It is probable that not all disputes will be susceptible of settle-
ment in such a manner; some will currently admit of no solution,
while others may be resolved by arbitration. But even in these cases,
the proceedings of conciliation may help in clarifying the issues and,
perhaps, narrowing the area of dispute. Another reason for the desira-
bility of such an arrangement is that it will help indirectly in the
creation of appropriate rules and principles governing the relations
between foreign investors and host governments. Since these rules will
be embodied in ad hoc arrangements or suggestions (whose secrecy is
at this point irrelevant, for secret or not, they will affect the policies
and methods of governments and investors), they will lack the authority
and precision of a judicially established rule. On the other hand, they
will presumably be based on a realistic appreciation of conditions and,
to some extent, on principles acceptable to both governments and in-
vestors. They have every chance, therefore, of being effective and
forming a solid basis for the development of legal rules and principles.
No draft convention relating to conciliation in disputes between
governments and private firms has been suggested, but a valuable text
which might serve as a basis for such a convention was issued a few
months ago by the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. The second section of the Rules 1962 of Arbitration and
Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes between Two
Parties of Which Only One Is A State 166 deals with the constitution
and operation of conciliation commissions. The Rules provide for the
constitution of three-member commissions at the request of the parties
166. Supra note 151.
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to the dispute and in accordance with a procedure similar to that
provided for the constitution of arbitral tribunals. 167 The parties to the
dispute undertake to pay their share of the expenses, to facilitate the
work of the commission "and particularly to furnish it to the greatest
possible extent with all relevant documents and information." 168 The
commission's task is described as follows:
The task of the Commission shall be to elucidate the questions in dis-
pute, to collect with that object all useful information by means of
enquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the parties to an
agreement. It may, after examining the case, inform the parties of the
terms which seem suitable to it. The parties undertake to study with the
utmost good will the recommendations submitted to them by the
Commission. 169
The commission will conduct its inquiry in accordance with its own
rules of procedure. It must hear both parties, who will be represented
by agents and, if need be, counsel and experts. When it reaches its
conclusions, the commission "shall inform the agents, orally or in writ-
ing, of the terms of a draft arrangement which it deems fit to recom-
mend . . . inviting them to declare their intentions within a fixed
time-limit. It shall point out to the agents, . . . the arguments which
seem to work in favour of that acceptation." 170 Of particular importance
are the provisions which stress the confidential character of the commis-
sion's work: the recommended terms whether accepted or not, are to re-
main secret, unless the parties decide otherwise, and the same is true of
most of the documents submitted to or issued by the commission.171 At
the same time, with the exception of "elements of proof possibly result-
ing from either survey reports or constats made on the sites or inter-
rogatories of witnesses," any proceedings before the commission will
not affect the rights of the parties in later arbitral or judicial pro-
ceedings.7 2
It seems probable that the non-binding character of the commission's
decision, its extra-legal character, as well as the assurances as to the
167. See supra note 151.
168. Sec. II, arts. 7, 8, o.
169. Sec. II, art. 9.
170. Sec. II, art. 13. For a statement of similar rules, applicable to conciliation
proceedings between states, see arts. 7-9 of the Regulations on the Procedure of In-
ternational Conciliation adopted by the Institut de Droit International at its Salz-
burg session (September 1961), in 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 741 (1962).
171. Rules 1962, supra note 151, Sect. II, arts. 16, 17. Cf., the Institut de Droit
International Regulations, supra note 17o, arts. 10-14. The element of secrecy was
also stressed in the discussions on the subject at Bangkok, supra note 165, at 3o.
172. Rules 1962, supra note 151, Sec. II, art. 18. Sec. III of the Rules, which deals
with conciliation and arbitration, further provides (art. 3) that "the members of the
Conciliation Commission may not be members of the arbitral Tribunal." For a
strong statement to the same effect at the Bangkok Conference on Commercial Arbi-
tration, see Domke, supra note 165, at 30.
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secrecy of the proceedings will reassure those governments or investors
who might be unwilling to bind themselves irrevocably for the future.
A possible addition to the rules summarized above would be a provision
for the participation in the conciliation commissions of industrial, finan-
cial or business experts rather than jurists. Such experts could be re-
cruited from the staff of the major international agencies, such as
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the Special Fund.
It may also be advisable to have such agencies, rather than, for instance,
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, administer the convention. This
may emphasize the technical character of the proceedings, and since it
would involve no major political responsibilities, it may be deemed
compatible with the main functions of these agencies.
The establishment of certain procedures for the settlement of disputes
between foreign investors and host governments is, despite the difficul-
ties involved, the most hopeful of the three directions which are being
explored today in the search for a multilateral system of protection of
foreign investment. This course of action is not only more feasible
than the others, but also perhaps the most useful since it provides
flexibility as well as the prospect of the development of a case law more
suitable to the problems of the present day. Further developments in
this direction should be expected soon. Of special interest in this
connection should be the results of the study currently pursued by the
staff of the World Bank.173
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It is clear that in recent years, governments, international agencies
and private persons and associations have made great efforts to devise
means by which the security of private foreign investment in under-
developed countries could be enhanced. At this stage, it is not possible
to assess the results of these efforts. To begin with, much remains to be
done: several schemes are still at the proposal stage; others have been in
operation for a very short time. More generally, the whole complex of
methods and means discussed in this article is of quite recent origin.
Even with respect to those methods and means that have been in use
for some time (at most about a decade), it is not easy to isolate the
effects of the factors relating to the security of investment from those
of the other factors. This is true both in the cases where certain positive
effects have been noted and in those where no effects at all can be
discerned. In most if not all cases, the conclusion of a bilateral invest-
ment treaty or the enactment of an investment law did not bring about
an immediate increase in the amount of foreign capital invested. 174
173. See UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT DECADE PROPOSALS FOR ACTIoN 96 (1962).
174. See, e.g., Behrman, in U.S. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT ABROAD
183 (Mikesell ed., 1962).
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This is no indication of the failure or uselessness of such assurances.
It is, however, an indication that there are limitations to the extent
to which the legal methods here discussed can encourage the investment
of foreign capital in less developed areas. An awareness of these limita-
tions is necessary before any concrete plans can be formulated or im-
plemented.
The assumption underlying the efforts now under discussion is that
an increase in the amount of capital invested in the less developed
countries can be brought about by the provision of assurances regard-
ing the security of investments.'7 5 Although there is a considerable
element of truth in this assertion, its validity is far from absolute. In
the first place, it is highly uncertain that there exists a direct causal
link between the lack of legal security and the unavailability of foreign
capital. The security of the investment is only one of several factors
which the investor takes into consideration and probably is not the
most important. It is not sufficient to induce the investor to bring his
capital in a particular country, in the absence of other favorable factors,
while, at the same time, it may stop him from venturing into a
country. It is difficult to determine the importance of the factor
of security with any precision. Existing surveys do not appear to indicate
that the investors themselves ascribe a very high order of importance
to considerations of security when considering possible new invest-
ments. 7 6 In the second place, to the extent that lack of security is a
factor, no legal guarantee or scheme can eliminate it fully. The in-
security of foreign investments is due largely, though not solely, to
certain objective conditions (such as political and economic instability)
over which the governments of the less developed countries have limited
control, and it is at these governments that most guarantees are aimed,
in the sense that they are intended to affect these governments' actions
concerning foreign investors.Y77
The considerations summarized above do not amount to a denial of
the usefulness of and necessity for legal assurances and guarantees;
they only serve to qualify their potential role and their present im-
portance. It cannot be contested that the present situation is not
satisfactory. The foreign investors and their spokesmen are fully justi-
fied in pointing this out and in stressing the need for more security for
their investments. The situation is hardly more satisfactory to the gov-
ernments of the majority of less developed countries. Faced with a short-
age of foreign private capital, they are in many cases prepared to offer
extensive inducements and guarantees. But they are not prepared
175. See, e.g., text following note 81 supra.
176. See Behrman, op. cit. supra note 174, at 184, 188; cf. text accompanying
note 105 supra; GUARANTEES 54.
177. Compare text accompanying notes 118 and 135 supra.
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to guarantee the continuation ad infinitum of the present status quo.
They cannot bind themselves to refrain from taking any measures
designed to promote their economic development whenever the in-
terests of foreign investors happen to be adversely affected by them.
Indeed, even if assurances to this effect were offered, prospective in-
vestors might well question their effectiveness. Guarantees which prom-
ise too much are likely to be violated when they become obviously
unsuited to existing conditions. It is of the essence of good diplomacy
not to make the grant of such assurances a condition for the acceptance
of less extensive, but more effective, promises, lest the effectiveness of
the latter be impaired by their association with the former.
It is certainly a difficult situation, but it is not an impasse, or at least
it should not be allowed to become an impasse. What is needed, first
of all, is a change of approach. The pressing problem today is not the
extent of the protection of private foreign investment, nor the uphold-
ing of the so-called "sovereign rights" of states and governments. It is
the promotion and, ultimately, the achievement of international eco-
nomic development. Developed as well as underdeveloped countries
have accepted this as a primary aim of national and international
policy. The process of economic development necessarily involves a
high degree of change-social, political and cultural as well as eco-
nomic 78-- and it is by encouraging, not by opposing, change that we
can affect the form and direction of this process.
The encouragement of private international investment is one aspect
of the larger problem-one means of promoting economic development.
Seen from this point of view, the need for security of investments does
not lose its importance. The protection sought is desirable both on
the basis of considerations of justice and equity and as a necessary (if
not adequate) condition for any increase in private foreign investment
in the less developed countries. At the same time, the need for flexibility
becomes apparent and qualifies in important manners the form and
extent of assurances of security. This is not the time for stating general
rules and formulating comprehensive and consistent legal systems. We
shall have to be content with compromises and solutions of specific
problems, hopeful that such solutions will give rise eventually to a
body of rules. For the time being, it is important to make sure that
the problems and disputes which are likely to arise in the relations be-
tween foreign investors and the host governments are resolved at an
178. A good case can be made that the term "economic development" is a
misnomer. This term is used to refer to a vast process of change which is economic
only in part. It is by no means certain that the purely economic aspect is the basic
or the most important one. The complexity of the process of economic development
is of course acknowledged by economists and other social scientists, but the con-
tinued use of the term is sometimes misleading.
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early stage and in an orderly manner. What is needed is a legal frame-
work for orderly change, but this framework may differ in several
important respects from that found in municipal law. It may be largely
of a non-judicial character and may involve bargaining and perhaps
the rewriting of contracts, rather than the more or less mechanical (or
apparently mechanical) application of pre-existing rules. In the majority
of cases, the methods used and the solutions given may be sufficient for
practical purposes, and this is all we can ask for at present.
